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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores economic behavior of producers in the U.S. sports indus-
try. The fundamental research questions are: (1) Can business efficiently operate un-
der competitive and noncompetitive environment? (2) Whether or not the difference in
competitive abilities leads to industry consolidation? This dissertation uses three cases to
investigate the research questions at different angles. The first essay studies the managerial
efficiencies in the Major League Baseball using Stochastic Frontier regressions. It discovers
that cost efficiency is not related to wins. Although, cost inefficiency is associated with
teams that spend more on players, especially pitchers, who is found to be less important
to team wins. What more related to victories are the amount of money put in the payrolls
and how efficient teams use players to produce wins. However, the technical inefficiency
has grown bigger in the recent years. The second essay explores the bidding behavior
of National Basketball Association teams for free-agent players, using a comparison of
marginal revenue and marginal cost of wins as the judgment. Contradicts other studies
that compare salaries with marginal revenue product of players, this study finds that the
“winner’s curse” does not exist and that teams do not over spend on players. The reason
wages are higher than the marginal revenue product can be because of the bargaining
power the player union exercised over the shares of teams’ fixed income to raise players’
salaries. The final essay studies the advertising behavior of the ski industry using the
Choice-Base Conjoint analysis. It discovers that smaller ski resorts are less competitive as
they face budget constraint. They do not try to compete with bigger operators and could
be the reason why the number of ski resorts in the U.S., especially the small ones, has been
shrinking recently.
For every drop of sweat my parents have shed
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Economics is a social science. Economics theories involve the study of behaviors. The
two main agents are consumers and producers. While many economic studies focus on the
consumer side, the studies in producer side are less common due to the lack of data. Many
theories remain theories without sufficient proofs, while many of the proven producer
theories are studied in laboratory setups. Fortunately, the sports industry provides a
real world environment that researchers can use as the experiment not only in consumer
studies, but also in the producer studies. Although the U.S. professional sports industry
does not play a crucial role in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), it is rich with data
suitable for producer behaviors researches. Above all, it is of interest of society: Students
play sports in school; there are sport channels on television; people speak of sports in daily
life.
The main problems of studies involving business sector are the lack of data. Businesses
are very sensitive to information. In the competitive environment, data are valuable, and
hence, kept confidential from competitors. Unfortunately, this means that the availability
of data to researchers is also limited. Unlike other businesses, major league sport teams
publish a wide variety of data to public. These data include the production resources
such as players’ salaries, and the output of production such as winning percentage. Many
financial data are publicly available, which is not common to other types of businesses. At
the same time, the different types of market powers seen throughout the sports industry
provide opportunity to examine economic theories in different scenarios. As a result,
this dissertation uses the U.S. sports industry as the real world experimental laboratory
to study the business’ economic behaviors.
Talking about the producer theories, one cannot deny that the main assumption is
2that businesses are rational. They all try to either maximize profits or minimize costs
of production. These two practices which can be achieved at various levels depend on
the ability of the businesses to exercise their powers. This ability is determined by the
competition in the industry. The more competition, the less power.
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. The first two chapters focus on the
environment where the industry is more competitive. The first chapter, “Efficiency Exam-
inations in the Major League Baseball: Stochastic Frontier Analyses,” studies the relative
efficiency in the Major League Baseball (MLB) teams’ management. This study uses the
stochastic frontier regression to discover the production efficiencies, namely technical effi-
ciency, the ability of teams to maximize wins given combinations of talents, and allocative
efficiency, the ability of teams to minimize cost given the levels of wins and acquiring
costs of talents. The finding shows that there exists some level of technical inefficiency
in the National League, and allocative inefficiency in the American League that can be
improved by a better resource allocation. Although, the result of the study indicates that
only technical efficiency and team’s payroll are related to wins.
The second chapter, “The Winner’s Curse in the Market for Free-Agent NBA Players,”
explores the absolute cost efficiency in the bidding process for players of the National
Basketball Association (NBA) teams. As the competition for talent becomes crucial for the
competition for wins that can influence team revenue, there is a possibility that teams will
fall victims to the “winner’s curse” where they pay players too much in comparison to the
benefit that they can reap from the players. The result contradicts the theory and previous
literature. This study does not find that NBA teams are victims of the winner’s curse.
Instead teams pay players less than their revenue contributions. The seem-to-be-overpaid
salaries needs not being a result of the winner’s curse. It may be because of the bargaining
power exercised by the player union that countervails the bargaining power of the league
over the share of fixed revenue, which is a part of revenue that is independent of teams’
performance.
The focus then shifts to the less competitive environment of the U.S. ski resort industry.
The final chapter, “Advertising Behavior in the U.S. Ski Industry: An Applied Conjoint
Analysis Method,” incorporates the Choice-Based Conjoint Analysis (CBC) of consumer
choice-selection studies into the study of business’ competitive strategies selection. The
3study focuses on advertising behavior of ski resorts with different financial constraints.
The results indicate that ski resorts of different sizes have different competitive behaviors,
in which the bigger resorts are more aggressive in competition.
CHAPTER 2




Despite being an entertaining sport, the Major League Baseball (MLB) generates mil-
lions of dollar each year to teams’ owners. The business of baseball involves conversion
of fans’ love to revenue. In the production process, baseball teams produce games from
inputs: players and staffs. Winning is the key to economic success of every team–it in-
creases fans’ spending on tickets, merchandises, media broadcasting rights, and so forth
(H. F. Lewis, Sexton, & Lock, 2007). At the team level, hence, victory is the output produced
from combinations of inputs, including players’ talents, managerial skills, training budget,
stadium facilities, and so forth.
Many studies attempt to discover the relationship between victory and inputs used
under different setups and objectives, and figure out how wins relate to revenue (Burger
& Walters, 2003; Hakes & Sauer, 2006; Jewell & Molina, 2004; M. B. Schmidt & Berri, 2002;
Szymanski, 2003; Zech, 1981). In contrast, many focus on efficiency perspective of team
management (Einolf, 2004; H. F. Lewis, Lock, & Sexton, 2009; H. F. Lewis et al., 2007; Porter
& Scully, 1982). Most conclusions are similar–there is inefficiency in the MLB; teams in
bigger markets tend to overspend on players.
This study aims to evaluate managerial efficiencies of MLB teams using the stochastic
frontier analysis. A similar study that uses the same technique is that of Porter and Scully
(1982) in which the authors use the 1961-1980 MLB seasons data to evaluate managerial
efficiency of the MLB managers. They conclude that there is no significant difference
5in efficiency among teams’ managers.1 However, the market structure of the MLB has
dramatically changed after the present of free agent contracts in 1977. Salaries of players
have been increasing tremendously in the past few decades as a result. This leads to a ques-
tion whether baseball managers are still efficiently exercising their budgets. As evidence
from recent studies apply another efficiency assessment technique, the Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA), has shown that bigger teams spend much more on players than smaller
teams but need not be more successful. There is a possibility that some teams, especially
teams in bigger markets, are less efficient than others.
While this paper is in line with other efficiency-related studies, it fills the gap with
another methodology that has not been pursued since there has been an adjustment in the
league’s market structure. Also, most stochastic frontier studies only focus on technical
efficiency. This study includes allocative efficiency to improve understanding of manage-
rial efficiencies. The outline of this paper is as follows. The next section discusses the
theoretical background of the methodology and data used in this study. The following
section presents results. The last section concludes.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Theoretical Background
There are two aspects of efficiency measurement: technical efficiency and allocative
efficiency. The former is the measurement in productive efficiency. The main idea is that
the more efficient firm can produce more output than the less efficient firm, given the same
level of input(s). In microeconomic theory, an efficient firm is a firm that uses the combi-
nation of inputs to produce the maximum output level given a particular technology. As a
result, the production function represents the highest possible level of output (production
possibility frontier) a firm can hope for. This highest possible output production is also
applied to other firms in the same industry and technology. In other words, the production
function of the most relatively efficient firm is the industry production function (Aigner &
Chu, 1968).
1The Stochastic Frontier Regression is used in efficiency examinations in other major league sports, such
as English Soccer (Dawson, Dobson, & Gerrard, 2000a, 2000b) and the National Basketball Association (Lee &
Berri, 2008) as well.
6Allocative efficiency, on the other hand, considers the ability of the firm to minimize
the cost of production at a given output level. A more efficient firm can produce the same
level of output as the less efficient team at a lower cost. If input prices and input demand
function are obtainable, by performing and analogous derivation in the dual cost function
problem to the production function, one can achieve cost-efficiency frontier (Kumbhakar
& Lovell, 2000).2
The stochastic frontier models were introduced by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977)
and Meeusen and van Den Broeck (1977). The analysis was developed to fit the context
of production function. The econometricians had been using the Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) to estimate production function prior to the introduction of the stochastic frontier
analysis. However, the OLS contradicts the tenet of production function that is supposed
to be the production possibility frontier or the highest possible output at a given input
level. The OLS estimates the average production, not the most efficient production.
The stochastic frontier applies different assumptions by assuming that there is an inef-
ficient factor in the error term. As a result, the “composed error” can be separated into two
main components: idiosyncratic error and inefficient factor. The idiosyncratic error, which
has the same definition as residual in the OLS, is a combined random factor contributing to
lower production which is beyond the firms’ control. The inefficiency factor is a factor that
lead to lower production; this factor is controllable by firms but is not efficiently controlled.
Coelli, Rao, and Battese (1998) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) provide great details of
the stochastic frontier analysis. Greene (2011) also describes mathematical derivations of
the analysis in details.
A stochastic frontier function f (xi, β) can be written as
yi = β0 + βxXi + vi ∓ ui (2.1)
where yi is the performance of the firm (output level, which assumes to be strictly positive,
for production function or cost for cost function), Xi is a vector of inputs (and output
for cost function), and vi is the two-sided noise or the idiosyncratic component of the
error. The term ui is the nonnegative technical inefficiency component of the error term
for the frontier production which indicates that inefficient firms produce less output than
2A detailed discussion of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency can be found in Appendix A.
7the efficient firm, or nonpositive for the frontier cost function which implies that the in-
efficient firms use higher cost of production than the efficient firm. The estimation from
the stochastic frontier approach, hence, represents the upper bound of production of the
production possibility frontier.
Although, the stochastic frontier analysis is very useful, there is another commonly
used technique for efficiency estimation, the linear programing Data Envelopment Anal-
ysis (DEA) method. The two approaches produce frontier of production with different
assumptions and techniques. They are not superior to one another but have different
advantages and disadvantages.
Measurement error, other noise, and outliers may influence the shape and position
of the frontier in the DEA method. This problem is less an issue in the stochastic fron-
tier model because the stochastic frontier separates the random error clearly from the
inefficient factor. The exclusion of an important input or output can result in biased
results under the DEA. In this regard, the stochastic frontier allows the tests of hypotheses
regarding the significance of the inputs, the existence of inefficiency, and the structure of
the production technology.
The stochastic frontier method, however, is only well-developed for single-output tech-
nologies. The production technology must be specified by a particular functional form
which might affect the estimation. In general, the stochastic frontier approach is more
appropriate in the study where the data might contain heavily measurement error that is
a major drawback of the DEA. Although, it might not be suitable for a study in which
multiple-output production is important, prices are difficult to define, behavioral assump-
tion such as cost minimization or profit maximization are difficult to justify (Coelli et al.,
1998).
In the context of MLB, one can consider the winning percentage from a given combina-
tion of offensive and defensive skills as the production function of the industry. Although
the data in the baseball industry are accurate, the DEA method might not be necessary
since it is an only single-output production. An assumption for this study requires cost
minimization to test the hypotheses of inefficiency, as a result, the stochastic frontier anal-
ysis seems to be a more appropriate method for estimations.
It shall be remarked that the stochastic frontier analyses need extra attention when it
8comes to the interpretations of results. The efficiency scores are only “relative efficiency”–it
is efficiency among the sample group which is different from the “absolute efficiency.” The
efficient firm under the conclusion of the stochastic frontier analysis (and the DEA) needs
not be absolutely efficient–the firm might use a better technique than other firms in the
sample but that technology may not be the best. This also means that the efficiency scores
are estimated in comparison with other firms within the group of samples and shall not
be compared across sample groups. For example, a higher efficiency score observed in a
team in the National League does not say that the team is more efficient than a team with
a lower efficiency score from the American League. Finally, the model does not take in
consideration the external environmental differences and may give misleading indication
of relative managerial competence (Coelli et al., 1998).
Despite the usefulness of the stochastic frontier model, there exist difficulties. First,
the technical inefficiency of a firm, although can be estimated, is not consistent due to the
fact that the variance of distribution of inefficiency is conditional on the whole error term.
Second, the specific assumptions about distribution of the inefficiency and the noise must
be specified. Third, the inefficiency is assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors
which may or may not be true. These problems can be overcome if the panel data are
presented (P. Schmidt & Sickles, 1984).
Given the nature of the dataset that are obtained from the whole sample group of the
MLB team, the fixed effect regression seems to be a more appropriate tool for the analyses
of both technical and allocative efficiency. The Fixed Effect (FE) model is taken in the form
of
yit = β0 + βxXit + vit ∓ ui (2.2)
where yit is the performance (production or cost) of team i in season t, Xit is the vector of
time-variant factors (inputs or input prices and output level), vit is the statistical noise and
ui is the time-invariant inefficiency parameter that takes different sign depends on function
(minus for production function and plus for cost function). This model can be simplified
as
yit = αi + βxXit + vit (2.3)
where αi = β0 ∓ ui. In other words, it is the team-specific effect that captures inefficiency
of the team.
9For efficiency analyses, the fixed effect model has been criticized due to the time-
invariant assumption. Also, the model cannot separate the inefficiency parameter from
the time-invariant heterogeneity factor of each team. The intercept β0i is considered as
the inefficiency factor which may not be true. The stochastic frontier analyses on the panel
data have been developed to separate the individual effect from the inefficiency factor such
that
yit = αi + βxXit + vit ± uit (2.4)
where αi is team-specific intercept in this case and uit is the time-variant inefficiency.3 As
for the stochastic production frontier analysis, the identical temporal variation assumption
shall not be used since the outcome of the game is zero-sum.4 Stochastic frontier models
that permit the team-specific temporal variation in efficiency are recommended by Lee
and Berri (2008) for sports team analysis. So, the following stochastic production frontier
analysis in this study is based on the time-varying, fixed effect models developed by
Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990) (from now on this model will be referred as FECSS
model), which is the most suitable with the nature of the industry.
The estimation of FECSS is based on the following equation:
yit = β0 + βxXit + vit − uit (2.5)
where yit is output level of firm i at time t, Xit is the input vector of firm i at time t, vit is
the statistical noise and ui is the technical inefficiency parameter of firm i at time t. One
can rewrite this equation as
yit = αi + βXiXit + vit (2.6)
where αi = β0 − ui. If there is inefficiency among firms, the intercepts will be different.
Cornwell et al. (1990) relax the assumption of time-invariant by assuming that inefficiency
can vary over time. They assume a quadratic form of flexible inefficiency parameter as
αit = θi1 + θi2t + θi3t2 (2.7)
3Some stochastic frontier models still assume time-invariant property in the inefficiency term.
4As one team performs better and get closer to the frontier, other teams will unavoidably perform worse
and push away from the frontier. If one team is successful in one season but not in other seasons, it does not
make sense to assume that the efficiency is the same over time.
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where t denotes time period. Hence, the firm-specific level of technical inefficiency of firm
i at time t can be estimated from
uˆit = αˆt − αˆit (2.8)
where αˆt = max
j
(αˆjt). This helps preserve the benefit of panel data while allowing for
cross-sectional variation in productivity growth rates and time-varying inefficiency.
As for the allocative efficiency analysis, there is no problem of the identical temporal
variation, hence, the time-varying “true fixed effect” (TFE) model introduced by Greene
(2005) is used in the analysis. The fixed effect (FE) model can be considered as “time-
invariant” stochastic frontier where u is assumed to be constant over time. The true fixed
effect (TFE) model assumes that u is varying overtime. The cost frontier model to be
estimated is
cit = β0 + βxXit + βyyit + vit + uit. (2.9)
2.2.2 Data
The team data used in this study are obtained online. The richness of the MLB data
makes it possible to compare and contrast the available data across various sources for
accuracy. The 2010 to 2015 MLB seasons are considered in this study since they are recent
and the league is stable over the time span. The outputs produced by teams, winning
percentages, are available on the MLB official website (www.mlb.com).
There are two types of inputs corresponding the two analyses. The inputs for exam-
ining technical efficiency are offensive and defensive statistics. In a game of baseball, the
team at bats is considered the offending team while the pitching team is the defending
team. Batters, hence, are in charge of team offense. Pitchers are responsible for team de-
fense. In this study, players are divided into batters and pitchers. Both contribute to team
wins differently via different types of performance. These performances are converted
to team wins. Players’ Wins Above Replacement (WAR) is used as players’ performance
that is included in the models as input of production. The data can be obtained from
www.baseball-reference.com/teams.
WAR is a single number that presents the number of wins the player added to the
team in comparison to a replacement player (from a AAA league) would add. Although
11
pitchers and batters have different roles, their performance both contribute to team’s wins.
Hence they both have WAR reported on the website. However, the calculations for the
two positions are different, some denotes pitchers’ WAR as DRAWAR5 to distinguish it
from batters’ WAR6, although the definitions are the same. For production factors, the
cumulative WAR and DRAWAR of previous season are used in the model.
Players’ WAR (and DRAWAR) are collected individually each year from the 2010 to
2015 season. From team rosters, players’ previous season performance is added up to get
the “cumulative WAR.” These are the total win players on the roster expected to jointly
produce to the team based on their latest performance.
As for allocative efficiency evaluation, inputs used are the factor prices. In the perspec-
tive of a baseball team, money spent on offensive and defensive ability directly serves as
the cost of production. There are, of course, other omitted operational costs associated with
running a team, such as managers’ payroll, stadium maintenance, and so forth. However,
there is evidence that managers’ salaries do not influence teams’ performance (Silvers &
Susmel, 2014), only players’ salaries are considered as input prices in this study. The cost
of win production only scopes on team payrolls. Input price for offensive ability (PWAR)
is team’s total batter salary divided by team’s cumulative WAR. The price of defensive
ability (PDRAWAR) is total team’s pitcher salary divided by team’s DRAWAR. The salary
information is from www.baseball-reference.com/teams.
Figure 2.1 illustrates scatter plots of the variables used in this study. The Pearson’s
test for correlation indicates that team wins has a significantly positive relationship with
team’s cumulative WAR (both WAR and DRAWAR) at 84.5%. Players’ salary is 25.63%
significantly positively correlated with players’ performance. The list of summaries of
statistics is in Table 2.1. Teams in the two leagues, National League (NL) and American
League (AL) have similar budget and cost (as for input factors) but it seems that teams in
the AL have, on average, relatively better players (higher WAR and DRAWAR).
5DRAWAR is Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP), adjusted for replacement level, converted to Run Scale
and adjusted for park adjustments factor and runs environment. For more information, see www.fangraphs
.com/library/war/calculating-war-pitchers/.
6WAR = (Batting Runs + Base Running Runs + Fielding Runs + Positional Adjustment + League Adjust-
ment + Replacement Runs) / (Runs Per Win). For more information, see www.fangraphs.com/library/war/
war-position-players/.
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Figure 2.1: Scatter plots of variables used
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Technical Efficiency
Table 2.2 presents the results from four models: OLS, Cross-section Stochastic Frontier
(SF), Fixed Effect (FE), and Panel Stochastic Frontier (FECSS) from the MLB and the two
major leagues: National League (NL) and American League (AL). There are two reasons
the estimations should be performed separately: First, different leagues use different tech-
nique and cost in their win production due to its different rules; second, the data used are
from regular seasons in which teams barely play against teams from another league.
The production function is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas production function in every
model. The models estimated are in the following forms.
OLS: ln WINPCTi = β0 + β1 ln WARi + β2 ln DRAWARi + ei
SF: ln WINPCTi = β0 + β1 ln WARi + β2 ln DRAWARi + vi − ui
FE: ln WINPCTit = αi + β1 ln WARit + β2 ln DRAWARit + vit
FECSS: ln WINPCTit = αi + β1 ln WARit + β2 ln DRAWARit + vit − uit
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Table 2.1: Summaries of statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MLB
WINPCT 180 50.00 6.77 31.50 63.00
WAR 180 20.13 7.23 2.7 39.7
PWAR 150 3,175,482.36 2,421,969.20 521,389.97 21,622,778.00
DRAWAR 180 14.46 6.50 1 37.2
PDRAWAR 150 4,362,470.32 7,193,063.21 415,567.72 92,365,000.00
Payroll 150 105,952,210.20 42,755,806.07 26,105,600.00 282,175,296.00
NL
WINPCT 90 50.09 6.68 35.2 63.0
WAR 90 18.95 6.24 3.20 31
PWAR 75 3,001,511.13 1,717,436.75 676,433.81 11,248,627.00
DRAWAR 90 13.84 6.66 2.70 37.2
PDRAWAR 75 4,286,416.62 3,047,704.54 415,567.72 15,537,205.00
Payroll 90 103,305,326.90 40,647,339.50 37,799,300.00 282,175,296.00
AL
WINPCT 90 49.92 6.91 31.5 60.5
WAR 90 21.32 7.97 2.70 39.70
PWAR 75 3,349,453.58 2,964,283.71 521,389.97 21,622,778 .00
DRAWAR 90 15.08 6.31 1.00 30.2
PDRAWAR 75 4,438,524.02 9,734,550.10 660,387.00 92,365,000.00
Payroll 90 108,599,093.50 44,836,171.39 26,105,600.00 228,106,128.00
where WINPCTit is team i’s winning percentage in season t, WARit is team i’s cumulative
WAR in season t, DRAWARit is team i’s cumulative DRAWAR in season t, vit represents
the idiosyncratic error and uit is nonnegative value represents other errors contributed
to lower level of output (productive inefficiency) independently distributed of vit. The
season-specific dummies were included in the pooled regressions but removed due to
the insignificance and inferiority according to the model selection criteria. The estimated
individual effects of the panel regressions are not presented in the table to conserve space.
Every model shows a similar result. The performance statistics are all highly statis-
tically significant with a positive sign as expected. The magnitudes are similar between
the four models (the chi-square test indicates that the mean marginal effects from the
four models are not statistically different). The predictabilities of the models are decent.
The likelihood-ratio test from the SF model rejects the null hypothesis that the inefficient
parameter is zero.7 In other words, it cannot be rejected that there is inefficiency in every
group of sample. The mean inefficiency scores are higher in the panel analyses (except



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for the NL). The F-test against the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the team-specific
dummies are equal to each other (no individual effects) is rejected at the 5% level (F(28,
148) = 1.66 and p = 0.0295). This implies that the panel models are more appropriate for
the study.
The estimated coefficients indicate that the production function has a decreasing re-
turns to scale. Using the concept of production possibility frontier, one can draw isoquants
of baseball production as in Figure 2.2 (using the estimations from the FECSS model). Each
isoquant represents the technical-efficient combinations of inputs used to produce each
level of wins. In comparison, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 are the plots of inputs combination each
team would be using in order to produce a winning percentage of 50% had they adjusted
their inputs combination proportionately to their current combination.






) for the NL is bigger
than that of the AL implies that inefficiency plays a bigger portion in production variation
in the NL case, in comparison to the AL. Consider the histogram of distribution in tech-
Figure 2.2: MLB’s Isoquants
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Figure 2.3: NL teams’ current inputs combination to produce 50% wins
Figure 2.4: AL team’s current inputs combination to produce 50% wins
17
nical inefficiency score of the two leagues in Figures 2.5 and 2.6, it seems that NL teams’
efficiency scores are not much dispersed from the most efficient team in comparison to the
AL where diversity can still be seen. This is consistent with the scatter plots in Figures
2.3 and 2.4 presented earlier. These might explain why the technical inefficiency is more
statistically significant among the NL teams in comparison to the AL teams in the pooled
regressions (because the outlier teams will be clearly considered as inefficient teams).
However, with the use of panel data, it seems that the AL, on average, suffers more with
technical inefficiency problem, as indicates by a higher mean inefficiency score. Looking at
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 that illustrate the trend in the inefficiency scores, the two leagues show
an inverse trend. The inefficiency scores were quite stable in the past but have become
bigger for teams in the NL in recent years. In the meantime, teams in the AL show a
slightly improvement in efficiency. Hence, it can be concluded that inefficiency is bigger
in the AL but the improvement can also be seen. On the contrary, in the NL, inefficiency
is low and quite stable throughout the periods of this study, but teams have become less
efficient in recent years. It should also be emphasized that inefficiency does not persist
over the season on the same team but rather switching from team to team in different
seasons. For example, the Seattle Mariners was least efficient team in the 2005 season, but
was the third most efficient team in the league in the 2015 season.
2.3.2 Allocative Efficiency
The discussion in the previous section concentrates upon the direct estimation of fron-
tier production function using only inputs-output relationship. It assumes that: first,
there are given fixed input levels which the managers attempt to maximize output level
accordingly; second, the managers try to maximize expected profit by selecting the levels
of inputs and output.
In this section, it is assumed that the over all cost efficiencies can be decomposed into
their technical and allocative components. The method accounts for factor-demand nature
which makes it more realistic than the estimator derived from production function alone
(Coelli et al., 1998, p. 32-33). Firms can be technically efficient while not being allocative
efficient (Greene, 2011, p. 843-844). The production frontier provides the best outcome
teams can achieve technically; the cost frontier, on the other hand, describes the best
18
Figure 2.5: Histogram of technical inefficiency score in the NL
Figure 2.6: Histogram of technical inefficiency score in the AL
19
Figure 2.7: Trend of technical inefficiency in the NL
Figure 2.8: Trend of technical inefficiency in the AL
20
economically outcome since it involves a behavioral objective of cost-minimization as well
(Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000, p. 51).
The Cobb-Douglas cost function models are estimated in the following forms.
OLS: ln Payrolli = γ0 + γ1 ln PWARi + γ2 ln PDRAWARi + γ3 ln WINPCTi + ei
SF: ln Payrolli = γ0 + γ1 ln PWARi + γ2 ln PDRAWARi + γ3 ln WINPCTi + vi − ui
FE: ln Payrollit = αi + γ1 ln PWARit + γ2 ln PDRAWARit + γ3 ln WINPCTit + vit
TFE: ln Payrollit = αi + γ1 ln PWARit + γ2 ln PDRAWARit + γ3 ln WINPCTit + vit − uit
where Payrollit is team i’s payroll in season t, PWARit is team i’s average input price of WAR
in season t measured from team’s total batters payroll divided by team’s cumulative WAR,
PDRAWARit is team i’s average input price of DRAWAR in season t estimated by dividing
team’s total pitchers salary by team’s cumulative DRAWAR, WINPCTit is team i’s winning
percentage in season t, vit represents the symmetric disturbance of the error component
and uit is nonpositive value represents other errors contributed to higher production cost
(cost inefficiency) independently distributed of vit. The season-specific dummies were
included in the pooled regressions but statistically jointly insignificant at the 5% level.
The estimated individual effects of the panel regressions are not presented in the table to
conserve space.
Table 2.3 reports the results of the four models. The results from the pooled regressions
are similar to each other but different from those of the panel regressions, that are also
similar to one another. The F-test against the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the
team-specific dummies are equal to each other (no individual effects) is rejected at the 1%
level (F(28, 147) = 7.20 and p = 0.0000). This implies that the team-specific panel analyses
are more preferable for the study, like the production models.
The statistically significant constant terms can be viewed as the teams’ fixed cost, which
is higher for teams in the AL. The significance test of the inefficiency parameter rejects the
null hypothesis in the NL group, but cannot reject the null hypothesis in the MLB and the
AL. This implies that only the NL teams are cost inefficient. The effect of the input prices
on team payroll is greater in the AL. This could be a result of the use of designated hitters
in the AL (so they have higher batter to pitcher ratio). Still, it is cheaper for the AL teams
to acquire wins in comparison to the NL teams. This also makes sense since, on average,






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































price of WAR is cheaper. Hence, AL teams which use more batters can gain better benefit
than the NL teams (that use one more pitcher, on average, more than the AL teams). The
fact that the NL teams pay more for less could explain why the inefficiency is observed in
the NL group in the SF model.
The fractions of variance due to the inefficiency (ρ) are bigger than the technical ef-
ficiency models. The fractions are more than 0.5 indicate that the variation in cost are
more than 50% comes from inefficiency. The NL, however, still has lower average ineffi-
ciency score according to the TFE models. This is visually illustrated by the histogram
of efficiency score in Figure 2.9 and the trend of inefficiency in Figure 2.10. From the
entire period, only one team in the 2015 season is considered deviating from the frontier,
although the observed inefficiency was very small. The AL, again, shows more diverse
inefficiency scores through the histogram in Figure 2.11. The trend in Figure 2.12 indicates
that the allocative inefficiency grows larger in recent years among the AL teams. The
difference between the pooled and panel models is a good example of heterogeneity effect.
With the different theoretical backgrounds of the models, it can be explained that there
exist individual effects that are misinterpreted as inefficiency in the pooled regressions.
Without the team-specific effects, none of the NL teams suffers from cost inefficiency, but
the AL teams do.
Figure 2.9: Histogram of allocative inefficiency score in the NL
23
Figure 2.10: Trend of allocative inefficiency in the NL
Figure 2.11: Histogram of allocative inefficiency score in the AL
24
Figure 2.12: Trend of allocative inefficiency in the AL
The efficiencies of teams in both leagues can be ranked by their mean inefficiency
scores. The ranks of mean technical efficiency scores presented in Table 2.4 are similar
between the panel and the pooled stochastic frontier models.8 The allocative inefficiency
scores, however, shows some contrast. There is no difference in allocative inefficiency
score obtained from the panel model of the NL group, but the inefficiency is observed in
the pooled data. This is opposite to what found from the AL sample. With the knowledge
about the significant individual effects, one can see that neglecting the teams’ heterogene-
ity can lead to a fault conclusion.
2.3.3 Payrolls and Efficiencies
Regular seasons success is an outcome of capability and managerial efficiency of the
teams (H. F. Lewis et al., 2009). There are various ways to view capability, one of which is
the resource capability or the ability to financially support the teams. Teams with higher
budget can compensate managerial inefficiency with more resources, and vice versa. Teams
with both capability and efficiency should be more successful.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 provide pairwise correlation coefficients between efficiency scores,
8Table C.1 in Appendix C summarizes MLB teams and their abbreviations presented in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4: Efficiency ranking
Technical Efficiency Allocative Efficiency WINPCT Payroll
Rank (FECSS) Rank (SF) Rank (TFE) Rank (SF) Rank Rank
National League
STL (0.031) PIT (0.047) PIT (0.000) PIT (0.083) STL (56.7) LAD (176.0)
PIT (0.035) STL (0.058) SDP (0.000) SDP (0.137) LAD (54.5) PHI (160.0)
ATL (0.047) ATL (0.069) MIA (0.000) MIA (0.154) SFG (53.5) SFG (126.9)
LAD (0.052) MIL (0.078) ATL (0.000) ATL (0.160) ATL (53.1) CHC (118.0)
WSN (0.055) ARI (0.079) WSN (0.000) WSN (0.179) WSN (52.7) STL (111.0)
PHI (0.056) LAD (0.081) COL (0.000) COL (0.192) CIN (51.2) WSN (107.0)
SFG (0.067) WSN (0.082) MIL (0.000) MIL (0.196) PHI (50.3) NMY (107.0)
MIL (0.073) PHI (0.086) STL (0.000) STL (0.196) PIT (50.2) CIN (96.9)
NYM (0.075) SDP (0.088) ARI (0.000) ARI (0.210) MIL (49.4) MIL (94.8)
MIA (0.079) SFG (0.088) SFG (0.000) SFG (0.218) NYM (49.2) ATL (94.6)
SDP (0.082) NYM (0.090) CIN (0.000) CIN (0.244) SDP (47.7) COL (85.4)
ARI (0.085) MIA (0.104) LAD (0.000) LAD (0.255) ARI (47.7) ARI (82.4)
CIN (0.100) CIN (0.117) NYM (0.000) NYM (0.257) CHC (45.6) SDP (67.8)
CHC (0.124) CHC (0.140) PHI (0.000) PHI (0.291) MIA (45.4) MIA (62.0)
COL (0.202) COL (0.219) CHC (0.000) CHC (0.357) COL (44.0) PIT (60.3)
American League
DET (0.065) DET (0.050) NYY (0.111) NYY (0.000) NYY (55.4) NYY (212.0)
NYY (0.098) NYY (0.055) CHW (0.112) CHW (0.000) TBR (54.1) BOS (166.0)
TEX (0.099) TEX (0.0565) KCR (0.113) KCR (0.000) TEX (54.0) DET (143.0)
HOU (0.114) CLE (0.065) LAA (0.118) LAA (0.000) DET (53.7) LAA (141.0)
TBR (0.120) TBR (0.066) BOS (0.120) BOS (0.000) OAK (51.6) TEX (113.0)
CLE (0.120) BAL (0.070) TEX (0.124) TEX (0.000) BOS (50.8) CHW (109.0)
BAL (0.126) CHW (0.072) BAL (0.124) BAL (0.000) BAL (50.4) TOR (103.0)
MIN (0.137) TOR (0.074) MIN (0.124) MIN (0.000) TOR (50.3) SEA (103.0)
TOR (0.145) MIN (0.0756) DET (0.128) DET (0.000) LAA (50.2) MIN (97.8)
OAK (0.146) OAK (0.078) TOR (0.133) TOR (0.000) CLE (48.9) BAL (94.0)
LAA (0.149) HOU (0.078) SEA (0.133) SEA (0.000) KCR (48.8) KCR (77.3)
CHW (0.152) BOS (0.081) TBR (0.142) TBR (0.000) CHW (47.8) CLE (71.7)
BOS (0.156) LAA (0.089) OAK (0.149) OAK (0.000) MIN (45.5) OAK (67.5)
KCR (0.180) SEA (0.095) HOU (0.156) HOU (0.000) SEA (45.0) TBR (65.8)
SEA (0.196) KCR (0.102) CLE (0.157) CLE (0.000) HOU (42.6) HOU (63.2)
Mean inefficiency scores in parentheses.
Payrolls in $ million.
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payrolls and wins, categorized by league. Figures 2.13 and 2.14 show the plots illustrated
the same relationship as in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. They show that technical inefficiency con-
tributes (negatively and significantly) to team success. Team payrolls have a significant
positive correlation with wins.9 Allocative efficiency, on the other hand, has no significant
relationship with wins. The fact that the correlation between efficiency scores and winning
percentage is modest is similar to a study conducted by Ruggiero, Hadley, and Gustafson
(1996). This indicates that a team could win either with better players even if those skills
are not efficiently used or with efficiently use of players although those players are not
superior in talents.
Consider the technical efficiency ranking generated from the FECSS model, payrolls
and winning percentages. One can see that successful teams from both leagues rank
high in technical efficiency. The St. Louis Cardinals ranks first in efficiency and average
wins. In the AL, the most successful team, the New York Yankees, ranks second for
technical efficiency. Both teams appear to spend good amounts of money on players.
Hence, the hypothesis is confirmed that teams with both capacity and efficiency should
perform relatively better.
The Pittsburgh Pirates, in spite of ranking second in the league, ends up in the middle
of wins ranking. Similar to the Houston Astros that ranks fourth in efficiency in its league
but comes up at the last place in performance. These two teams share one common
characteristic: they both spent the least on players in comparison to other teams in their
leagues. On the other hand, teams with higher budget but lower efficiency such as the
Chicago Cubs and the Boston Red Sox also finish in the middle of wins ranking. This
supports the claims of the famous novel “Money Ball” (M. Lewis, 2004) and the study of
Jewell and Molina (2004) that smaller teams can compete with bigger teams if they are
more efficient. Unfortunately, efficiency alone cannot bring any team to the top spot. As
for competitive balance issue, it is little relief that only larger pockets do not make a richer
team an unbeatable champion.
There is no significant correlation between the technical and allocative efficiency in both
leagues. However, a significant, strong, positive correlation between allocative inefficiency
9Although, this does not imply causality between payroll and wins and only indicates that the two
variables are moving together in the same direction.
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Table 2.5: Pearson’s correlation matrix (National League)
Technical Allocative Total Players Winning
Inefficiency Inefficiency Salary Percentage
Technical Inefficiency 1.000
Allocative Inefficiency -0.008 1.000
Total Players Salary -0.041 0.469*** 1.000
Winning Percentage -0.611*** 0.107 0.237** 1.000
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.6: Pearson’s correlation matrix (American League)
Technical Allocative Total Players Winning
Inefficiency Inefficiency Salary Percentage
Technical Inefficiency 1.000
Allocative Inefficiency 0.091 1.000
Total Players Salary -0.164 0.115 1.000
Winning Percentage -0.386*** -0.075 0.280*** 1.000
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Figure 2.13: Correlation plots (National League)
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Figure 2.14: Correlation plots (American League)
and team payrolls is observed in the NL. This indicates that richer teams tend to be alloca-
tive inefficient (in the NL). This follows the findings of previous literature, such as Einolf
(2004); Jewell and Molina (2004); H. F. Lewis et al. (2009, 2007). Despite the finding that
allocative inefficiency does not deter team success, this finding still leads to a conclusion
that the NL teams fail to efficiently allocate their budget. Consider the contribution to
team wins between batters and pitchers, the NL teams can improve their efficiency by
relocating their budget more toward batters. Another evidence supporting this idea is
from the positive correlation between allocative inefficiency scores and DRAWAR in the
NL group, which indicates that the inefficient teams tend to collect more talent pitchers (at
the 30% significant level–the result is not included).
2.4 Conclusion
This study evaluates technical and allocative efficiency in the MLB using the data from
the 2010 to 2015 seasons. The analyses perform stochastic frontier regressions, similar to
the work of Porter and Scully (1982) that studied the same issue. The discontinuation of
the stochastic frontier analysis study leads to a missing information to either support or
against the findings on the MLB efficiency studies conducted by the DEA method. This
study fills in this gap.
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With the use of panel data, this study shows that there are some differences in technical
efficiency among the MLB teams. On average, the NL teams do not suffer from allocative
efficiency problem, although the technical inefficiency seems to grow larger in recent years.
On the other hand, allocative inefficiency problem is growing in the AL.
A growing trend in inefficiency, both technical and allocative, is quite surprising es-
pecially in the context of sport tournament where spectators are focusing on teams’ per-
formance and owners are seeking for returns on investment. It also should be noted that
baseball players’ performance is quite consistent from season to season (50.74% significant
correlation of current season and past season performance at the 1% level) which should
make it less difficult for managers to plan their strategies and make contract offers. Fur-
thermore, it should also be stressed that inefficiencies do not persist across the seasons on
the same team, but rather switching from team to team on different seasons.
The Pearson’s correlation tests indicate that allocative efficiency has no significant cor-
relation with teams’ success. Technical efficiency contributes the most to teams’ average
wins, follows by teams’ average player salaries. Teams with both financial capacity and
managerial efficiency success in the competition while teams that have one or another can
somewhat substitute between the two, although they are more likely not be able to reach
to the top spot.
Although, there is no significant different in efficiency scores of the NL teams in gen-
eral, wealthier teams in the league show a significant positive relationship with allocative
inefficiency, indicates budget management problem where teams unnecessarily spent too
much money on wrong players, perhaps pitchers, who contribute less to team wins at the
same cost as batters. For improvement, teams should pay more attention not only on the
amount of money they put into the rosters, but also on the allocation of money.
Future research can look closer into the importance of relationship between teams and
players, staffs and players and between players in order to find a more concrete reasons
for the teams’ success beyond just players’ salaries aspect, which has been extensively
discovered. This study only considers the conversion of inputs into output; it does not
explore the production process of baseball teams. More thorough discoveries on specific
techniques that teams use, which are now available in great detail, will, perhaps, fulfill the
lack of details for technical efficiency in this study.
CHAPTER 3
THE WINNER’S CURSE IN THE MARKET FOR
FREE-AGENT NBA PLAYERS
3.1 Introduction
In a common value auction with imperfect information, bidders offer their bids, in-
dividually and secretly for goods or services, estimated from their expected return. The
winner is the one who offers the highest money and is also the most optimistic bidder in
the auction war. Logically, the true value of the product should be closer to the mean value
of offers. Since the winning bid is usually greater than the mean bid, the winners of the bid
have greater tendency to pay more than the true value. In other words, the winners have
greater chance to overvalue the product. This phenomenon is called a “winner’s curse.”
The winner’s curse theory originates in natural resource economics, under the study of
bidding war for oil fields (Capen, Clapp, & Campbell, 1971). It has also been applied to a
number of studies in sport economics literature, many of which focus on the biddings for
hosting mega sport events such as the Olympics, the FIFA World Cup, and the Super Bowl
(Baade & Matheson, 2002, 2004, 2006; Burns, Hatch, & Mules, 1986; Mules & Faulkner,
1996; Ritchie, 1984; Ritchie & Aitken, 1984; Ritchie & Smith, 1991). The results are almost
always pointing into the same direction–hosting countries (or cities) overspend on the
events and make lower than expected return, or even negative returns. This implies that
there is a winner’s curse in mega sport event auctions.
In another respect, major league teams almost always involve in bidding wars for
players due to a limited number of talented players. Salaries of major league players are
one of the highest occupations in the United States. There are two possible causes for such
high wages: monopoly power of players, either from super star power or from the player
union, or bidding wars among teams.
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Rosen (1981) is the first to present a theoretical framework on the Economics of Super-
stars. In this pioneer work, the author shows that superstars enjoy premiums of their supe-
rior talent. This reward is not linearly but multiplicatively related to talent. Audience have
higher demand for talents, so players with more talents have bigger market they can sell
their talents to. The bigger the market size, the more income the players get, because the
teams that acquire such talents gain higher returns. Mathematically, the reward function
is convex in talent in which the rate of return of talent depends on the functional form of
the reward function. Furthermore, as demand expands, the concentration of income tends
to be larger for the stars if the demand is elastic to talent.
There are various studies that explore the winner’s curse in the player market. Blecher-
man and Camerer (1996), Burger and Walters (2008), and Cassing and Douglas (1980)
use data from the Major League Baseball (MLB) from different time spans and different
techniques; every study discovers the winner’s curse in the teams’ bidding for player
process. Massey and Thaler (2013) study the same issue in the National Football League
(NFL) drafting behavior of teams and discover a supportive evidence.
The National Basketball Association (NBA) is one of the most famous sport in the
United States. Star players’ salaries are tremendously high. Almost every team has at
least one star player. In 2015, the average NBA player’s salary is $5.15 million, with the
highest pay of $23.5 million earned by Kobe Bryant of the Los Angeles Lakers. By far, the
NBA players earn more than any other professional sport players.1 Eschker, Perez, and
Siegler (2004) explore the winner’s curse problem in the NBA, focusing on the international
players, and reveal that international players were overpaid by teams and there existed the
winner’s curse in the NBA during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 seasons, at the beginning of the
influx of international players. The curse, however, disappeared afterward. Groothuis,
Hill, and Perri (2009) find that there is a great uncertainty and false positives in players’
performance from drafting system where teams overestimate the performance of players.
They, however, conclude that this might not be a result of the winner’s curse, rather it is
because that there are very few talented players. If the teams want a chance to win over
these players, they have to invest in them just like buying a lotto where they rely on the
1In 2015, the average MLB player earns $3.2 million, the NHL average earning is $2.4 million and the NFL
average salary is $1.9 million.
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accuracy of talent evaluation, but the chance is of winning the prize is still uncertain as
well as the uncertainty of performance.
The aim of this study is to evaluate whether NBA teams can accurately predict the true
value of their players or fall into the trap of the winner’s curse. The finding from this study
should provide some insightful information to teams’ managers about their bid strategies.
If such a curse persists, the managers should learn how to avoid the curse by discounting
all bids accordingly. Also, it should help shed some light on the theory of winner’s curse
under the real world circumstance. The structure of this paper is as follows. The following
section presents theoretical background of the winner’s curse. Section 3 presents data
sources and methodology implemented in this study. Fourth section provides empirical
results. The conclusion and recommendation are in the last section.
3.2 Theoretical Background
Capen et al. (1971) brought the issue in the closed-envelop competitive bidding process
to light, using an example of competitive bidding for petroleum field in the Gulf of Mexico.
The authors present that the return on investment often does not meet the expectation of
firms–the return was either lower than expected or even became negative, which made
average return on investment become negative. Each bidder has different information,
which leads to different expected return on investment. Even if the information is exactly
the same, expectations are different among bidders due to different perceptions. This leads
to varying expected return, which can be too high or too low, and almost no chance of
being exactly the true value of the object in the auction. The winner firm of the competitive
bidding is the firm that has highest expected return or overestimates the true value because
the firm is less likely to win the bid if it was to undervalue the object. This is the so-
called the “winner’s curse.” From the simulation method of an expected winning bid
probabilistic model presented in Capen et al. (1971), it seems that the expected winning
bids tend to be higher when there is more information, when there is more uncertainty
about true value, and when there are more bidders. The author suggests that once bidders
realized the existence of the winner’s curse, they should lower their bids accordingly.
Thaler (1988) defines the winner’s curse into two versions: the winner receives negative
return on investment and the winner receives less than expected return on investment.
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Both versions of the curse leave the winner disappointed. Thaler further explains that
economic theories normally assume rationality, while it is difficult in such a competitive
bidding setup because the expected value of an investment is indeed conditioned on win-
ning the auction. Firms tend to bid more aggressively as number of bidders increases.
Meanwhile, winning an auction war against more bidders increases the chance of the firm
overestimating the true value.
The early experiment on the winner’s curse was conducted by Bazerman and Samuel-
son (1983). A coins-filled jar worth $8 was the auction object while subjects, 419 MBA
students in 12 microeconomics class at Boston University, did not know the true value of
the object. The study discovered that in the closed-envelop auction environment, the mean
estimated value of the object was approximately $3 below the true value. Nevertheless, the
mean winning bid was $2 above the true value of the object. This serves as evidence of the
winner’s curse.
Several experimental studies followed such as those of Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987),
Kagel and Levin (1986), and Samuelson and Bazerman (1985). The results point in the
same direction that there exists winner’s curse. Although the curse is realized and can be
eliminated as bidders gain more experience and knowledge, it is difficult to avoid such a
curse due to complexity of valuation of the product’s true value and bidding competition.
However, laboratory studies usually face criticisms about the realism. Hence, various field
experiments were conducted; most encounter evidence of the winner’s curse (Hendricks
& Porter, 1988; Roll, 1986; Varaiya, 1988; Varaiya & Ferris, 1987).
Cassing and Douglas (1980) study the winner’s curse theoretically and explore real
world phenomena using the Major League Baseball (MLB) data. The authors develop a
theoretical study base on a noncompetitive environment where teams bid for talent from
a player who is the monopoly of his own talent that has the marginal revenue product
(MRP) equal to B/2.2 The teams’ expected value of the MRP is assumed to have a uniform
distribution with the range between 0 and B. In other words, sometimes the MRP will be
underestimated and sometimes be overestimated. If there is only one team that bids for
2This is an adaptive model of Capen et al. (1971) to the free-agent player market. The probabilistic model of
the curse is exactly the same as that of Capen et al. (1971) except that the authors assume that the product’s (in
this case, player’s) true value has a uniform distribution where the original work uses exponential distribution.
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players several times, on average, the bidding offers will be equal to the players’ MRP.
In competitive environments with more than one team that are involved in the bidding
war, on the other hand, teams that correctly estimated the true value are usually not the
winner. The winners are usually the teams that overestimate the MRP. Although teams
have identical information about players, they can still offer different bids due to some
human element in digesting information.
Assume that there are n bidding teams where every team has an identical uniform
distribution for MRP on the interval [0, B] with mean B/2 and in order to win the bid,
the winner must offer $x to player. This means that there will be n − 1 teams that lose
the bidding war. Hence, the probability that all but one team bids less than x is (x/B)n−1.
Given K is a constant necessary to make h(x), the p.d.f. of the winning bid, integrate to
1, h(x) = K(x/B)n−1(1/B). In the case where K = n, we can write an equation of the







n(x/B)ndx = [n/(n + 1)]B. (3.1)
It can be seen that EWB will equal to MRP (B/2) only when there is one team in the
bid and exceeds MRP when N ≥ 2. The size of EWB increases and approaches B as n
increases. In conclusion, free-agent players tend to be paid more than their true value
under competitive bidding environment and the size of extra pays tend to be bigger as the
number of bidding teams increases.
Cassing and Douglas find that teams overpay players. However, the authors conclude
that selection bias of samples could result in such finding. Only better players tend to
switch teams, and vice versa. As a result, players with uncertain performance, who are
not represented in the samples, tend to stay with their former team; the good ones are the
ones that move and create higher value for their new teams. Burger and Walters (2008)
use a newer data set and a more sophisticated technique to measure performance and
discover the same issue. The authors conclude that, with available information on players,
especially about risk, teams still fail to avoid the winner’s curse when they are faced with
complex valuation problems such as talent; teams continued to overvalue players. Massey
and Thaler (2013) similarly study the same problem in the National Football League (NFL)
teams’ drafting behavior. The finding follows those of the MLB studies that performance
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is also overvalued in the NFL.
L. M. Pepall and Richards (2001) use a game theoretical framework to explain such
phenomena under a Bertrand duopolistic setup where two teams, i and j, are competing
downstream in a price competition of output that involves the usage of a superstar and
upstream where the two teams compete in a bidding war for a superstar. At equilibrium,
if the ticket price of one team is positively correlated with the present of a star in another
team, a price war begins and both teams are worse off. If the ticket price is negatively
affected by the present of a star in another team, star player softens competition and both
teams benefit, except that the team which hires the star receives less profit. In other words,
there is a tendency for the winner’s curse to occur in the market where price of end product
negatively corresponds to the present of stars.
3.3 Data and Methodology
Winner’s curse in the player market occurs if the winner of the bid has an expected
value of a player that is greater than his real value. The expected value of a player is
the return the team estimated that they will get from hiring that particular player. For
any rational team, the pay will not exceed the player’s expected generated income. In
mathematical expression,
wi(MPLi) ≤ MRPi (3.2)
where wi(MPLi) is the offered player’s salary based on his expected marginal product of
labor (MPL) which, in sports, is the marginal win produced by player, and MRPi is player’s
marginal revenue product or his contribution to team income in dollar term (MRP =
MR × MPL). However, there is an uncertainty about the true value of the player’s pro-
duction that makes some teams, although rational, more likely to overvalue the player
and offer a wage that is above his MRP. A team falls a victim of the winner’s curse if they
win the bid while their expected value (E(MRP)) of the player more than the true (average)
value (MRP).
E(MRPi) > MRPi (3.3)
In bidding process with almost identical information, the expected value of a player
should be similar between teams. Hence, the distribution of expected value is known
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to the bidders. The bid distribution does not reveal the underlying true distribution of
MRP. To guarantee that they will be able to sign a player, teams, with no information
about other teams’ offers, teams have to offer their best possible contract they can under
the profit-maximizing condition. The offered salary needs not be equal to the player’s
expected value, but it needs to be above other teams’ offers in order to win. Some teams
might offer bids that are lower than the true value, and vice versa, but on average, the
bids should be close to the true value. In other words, the part of player’s salary that is
determined by expected marginal product (E(MP)), must be equal to player’s expected
value (E(MRP)) perceived by the competitive auction bidders. The winners’ E(MRP)s, as
a result, are usually higher. It is important to stress that the wage mentioning here is
only a partial wage that is determined by player’s expected production and not the actual
wage that may include other aspects of the player such as age, experience, charisma, union
power, team power, hedging against the winner’s curse, and so forth.
wi|E(MPLi) ≤ E(MRPi) (3.4)
From labor economic theories, w = MC × MPL for profit maximizing business in
competitive market. Since MRP = MR × MPL, one can rewrite the previous equation
as
MC× E(MPL) ≤ MR× E(MPL) (3.5)
From Equation (3.5), divide both sides of by E(MPL):
MC ≤ MR (3.6)
The salary is less than or equal to expected marginal revenue product, hence, marginal
cost is less than or equal to marginal revenue. This is true either under the perfect com-
petitive environment or the noncompetitive environment where the bargaining power
of the players and the teams are equal and cancel out each other. The true value of a
player cannot be directly observed because it involves many perspectives; some of which
cannot be measured, for example, leadership, personality, and so forth. However, the the
estimated marginal revenue product (MRP) can be predicted if MR and MP are known. As
a result, this study assumes that teams have information about players’ the mean marginal
product and its distribution. Although, teams still face uncertainty of performance due to
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the variance in performance, which is different from player to player. Also, teams already
have a plan on how to use the players in their games, for example, they have expectations
about how much time the players will be put on the court throughout the contract period.
Previous studies of the winner’s curse in bidding for players almost always compare
singular wages with MRP of players to justify whether there exists the winner’s curse
or not. As mentioned earlier, considering that there are many factors determining wage
and the conclusion about winner’s curse drawn from the fact that wage is greater than
MRP might not be realistic. As a result, this study focuses on the evaluation of MC and
MR of wins that are contributed by players to reach the conclusion about the winner’s
curse. There are three main steps of the estimation. The data used in each steps must be
chosen carefully to best fit the methodology. The data can be separated into team level and
individual player level data. The descriptive statistics of the data used in this study is in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Summaries of statistics from the 2004/05 to 2014/15 NBA Seasons
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Individual
Salary ($) 691 6,741,807 4,929,465 304,897 23,239,562
Win Score (games) 691 3.65 3.94 -3.33 23.65
Variance of WS (games) 691 8.79 10.86 0.00 76.14
Height (in.) 691 78.64 3.69 65 87
Weight (lb) 691 216.13 27.33 135 325
Experience (year) 691 8.56 2.62 6 18
Age (year) 691 30.02 3.02 24 40
All Star 50
Position, center 115
Position, power forward 111
Position, point guard 136
Position, small forward 127
Position, shooting guard 124
Team
Total Revenue 330 13,200,000 40,000,000 54,000,000 307,000,000
Team Payroll 330 66,738,678 12,562,757 23,380,124 126,610,272
Win82 330 40.99 12.66 9 67
Population 330 5,347,834 4,847,263 987,535 20,182,305
Stadium Capacity 330 19,103.430 1,046.442 16,867 21,165
Playoff 330 0.533 0.500 0 1
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3.3.1 Evaluation of Players’ Contribution to Wins
The first step of the analysis is the calculation of players’ contribution to teams’ wins.
The win score (WS) method introduced by Berri (2008) is implemented in this study. The
main advantage of WS is that it measures players’ production in term of numbers of wins
generated to team which makes it possible to summarize players’ performance into one
unit of tangible measurement, wins. The method involves two main steps: the calculation
of players’ action on court and the actual win contribution of each player to his team
in each season. It shall be noted that win score is selected in this study not because it
best predicts player performance nor does it highly related to wages; it is chosen mainly
because it directly illustrates players’ contribution as number of wins produced which is
more suitable for the study of MRP. Appendix D describes the full steps of WS calculation.
In the steps of evaluation of players’ action, team-level data are used. The individual
performance statistics are required for the following steps.
Both team-level and individual-level performance data for the NBA 2004/2005 sea-
son through the 2014/2015 season are obtained from www.basketball-reference.com. It
should be noted that players who appeared less than 20 games per season or spent time
on court less than 12 min per game were excluded due to their minimal impact on the
games. A total of 1,410 qualified players, free agents, and not-free agents, are included in
the first step of WS evaluation. This is to get the most accurate values of players’ actions,
since every player shares some part of contribution in games. Every analysis after the
evaluation of WS only uses 691 free-agent players with multiyear contracts because they
can better represent the competitive market that is the main focus of this study. As for
team-level data, since there are 30 teams across 11 seasons, the total of 330 observations
are used.
It is important to understand that in the Berri (2008)’s version of WS, players’ con-
tributions are evaluated only for each particular season. Despite being a useful tool to
evaluate player’s production, the season-specific nature of the variable is a drawback for
cross-season studies. In this study, WS will need to be compared across season. As a result,
some adjustments are necessary.
In the final step of the calculation for WS, Berri divides player’s Wins Produced per 48
min played (WP48), which is calculated from performance statistics, by 48 and multiplies
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by the actual minutes played (MP) to get the win score, WS. For the analysis of this study,
WP48 for every player for each season are estimated and averaged across the years of
contract, player-by-player. So, the WP48 used in this study is the contract-length average
WP48 of each player.3 The variance of WS is calculated per player from the contract-length
average WS.4 There are 804 free-agent players whose names appeared in the roster for the
2004/2005 to 2014/2015 season that are qualified from the selection criteria. However, in
order to calculate the variance of performance which is crucial to this study, only players
who signed multiple-year contracts are included and the sample size reduces to 691.
Figure 3.1 is the histogram of contract-length average WP48 of free-agent players. The
distribution is symmetric which indicates that player’s performance are normally dis-
tributed. This is consistent with the normal quantile plot in Figure 3.2. However, the
actual contribution comes from the amount of time each player spent on court. In this
study, it is assumed that teams know the average WP48 and variance of WP48 of each
player as they can observe performance of every player across several seasons, and that
they also know how much time each player will be placed on court. After dividing the
contract-length average WP48 by 48 and multiply by contract-length average minutes
played of that player, the expected WS of each player is obtained and assumed to be known
by team prior to bidding process.5
To ensure that the use of expected WS in this study will be consistent with the actual
WS (denote as AWS) calculated for each player for each season from Berri (2008) method,
the correlation between WS and AWS for 691 free agents is calculated. It appears that there
is a 90.28% significant relationship between the two variables. The scatter plot in Figure 3.3
illustrates this relationship. As a result, the implementation of expected WS in this study
should not significantly impact the results.











n , where n is years in contract.
5WSi = (WP48i/48)×MPi.
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Figure 3.1: Histogram of free-agent players’ contract-length average wins produced per 48
min
Figure 3.2: Normal quantile plot of free-agent players’ contract-length average wins pro-
duced per 48 min
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Figure 3.3: Scatter plot of free-agent players’ actual and expected win score
Figure 3.4 is the histogram of expected win score of free-agent players.6 The distribu-
tion is right-skewed. The shorter left tail implies that there are not many “bad” players
among the free-agent NBA players. The longer right tail indicates that superstars are hard
to find. Figure 3.5 is the normal quantile plot of the expected WS. It shows that distribution
of WS deviates severely from normal. Hence, Figures 3.1 and 3.4 indicate that greater
wins contributed to team does not come solely from superior performance as measured by
WP48, but also from longer minutes played.
Figure 3.6 shows that the variance of WS is very right skewed. This implies that there
are only a small amount of players with inconsistent WS. This is in line with the 70%
correlation of players’ WS from one season to another season that implies the consistency
of players’ performance across the seasons.
3.3.2 Evaluation of Marginal Cost of Win
The marginal product of each free-agent player, namely expected win score (WS), from
the previous steps are used for the calculations of marginal cost (MC) and marginal rev-
6As mentioned earlier, win score is calculated from actual performance in particular season multiply by the
actual time on court. Meanwhile, expected win score is estimated from contract-length average performance
multiply by the actual time on court.
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Figure 3.4: Histogram of free-agent players’ expected win score
Figure 3.5: Normal quantile plot of free-agent players’ expected win score
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Figure 3.6: Histogram of variance of free-agent players’ expected win score
enue (MR) of win. The MC of wins is defined as the amount of money teams spent in
order to win one extra game. Since teams use players to produce victories, salaries of
player determine the MC. As teams only have limited spots in the roster, in order to win
more games, rather than a higher quantity, quality of player is required. Better players
cost more to team. This study assumes that MC of WS is constant. The salary data come
from www.basketball-reference.com. Since many players sign multiyear contracts, the
contract-length average salary is used for the analysis for simplicity. Other costs associated
with wins are neglected as we only consider the cost of wins the teams spent on players.
As expected WS presents the expected production of wins each player produced, it is
the expected marginal product (E(MPL)) of that player. Once the MP is calculated, the
“MRP realized wage,” the base salary that is determined by player’s MRP or w|E(MPL)
can be determined. The use of WS especially the assumption that the realized MP is known
prior to the contracts were signed might not be realistic. However, as stated in Capen et al.
(1971) that a better technology used for estimating the true value of product, in this case
WS, might narrow the uncertainty but it does not necessarily change the expected value.
To control for other characteristics of players that might affect the salary negotiations,
a regression of salary as a function of player’s MP, controlling for other player’s character-
istics, can be performed using the following equation.
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where wk is player’s salary; WSk is player’s expected win score, VarWSk is variance of
player’s win score that captured uncertainty in the marginal product of player,Zk is other
characteristics of player’s: age, age-squared, experience, height, weight, position played,
and superstar status (measure by all-star game appearance). The estimated coefficient α1
is the MC of wins. While WS and VarWS comes from the previous step, the rest of the
information is from www.basketball-reference.com.
Consider the histogram of free-agent salary in Figure 3.7, one can observe a right-
skewed distribution. This indicates that only a small portion of players receive higher pay.
The Lorenz Curve in Figure 3.8 shows that there is evidence of inequality in pay among
NBA free-agent players. Although not presented here, the inequality is also observed in
the all NBA player sample, which includes both free-agent and not free-agent players. The
inequality seems to be worse for the whole sample. This is understandable since numerous
not-free agents receive lower pay contracts than the free agents, especially the rookies that
usually get paid at the minimum wage.
Figure 3.9 show a positive relationship between salary and expected performance of
free-agent NBA players. Although the plots show no strong correlation, the direction
of the relationship in both graphs indicates that teams do realize players’ contributions
and reward them accordingly. There is 39.56% significant correlation between the two
variables.
3.3.3 Evaluation of Marginal Revenue of Win
The next step of this study is to evaluate the value of player as the contribution that each
player makes to the teams’ revenue. The pioneer work on monetary valuation of wins is a
study of Scully (1974). The calculation involves the estimation of marginal revenue (MR),
or in the specific term for sport teams, marginal wins value (MWV) for each team. The
MWV is the revenue the team expected to gain from winning one extra game. Rascher and
Rascher (2004) indicate that team’s revenue is a function of market characteristics and team
characteristics. Overall, one can say that there are various factors determining revenue of
a team.
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Figure 3.7: Histogram of free-agent players’ salary
Figure 3.8: Salary cumulative distribution in the NBA free-agent market
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Figure 3.9: Scatter of salary and expected win score
To study this topic, we need team-level data. There are many factors contributing to
revenue. The most important factors are winning percentage of current and previous sea-
son. Other determining factors include extra game played after the regular season (mea-
sured by playoff appearance), market size (measured by population in the metropolitan
area where the franchise located), stadium capacity, and year-specific dummies to account
for economic impact such as inflation and industry growth. The winning percentage
data are gathered from the NBA official website (www.nba.com). The population data
are collected from http://www.census.gov and http://www.statcan.gc.ca. The sta-
dium capacity data are published at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of National
Basketball Association arenas. The revenue data are collected from the 2004/2005 to
2014/2015 seasons, which are available at www.forbes.com/teams.
With our main focus on winning, we can regress a total revenue function from the
following model.





where TRi is team’s total revenue, Win82i is number of games won per 82 games played
calculated by multiplying team’s winning percentage by 82,Xi is a vector of external factor
affecting team’s total revenue, and β1 is the MWV or the MR.
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Figure 3.10 is the histograms of teams’ total revenue from the 2004/05 to 2014/15 NBA
season in nominal term.7 Total revenue distribution skews to the right in every season
indicating that there is a small number of teams that generate higher revenue than others.
Due to disagreements between players and teams, the 2011/12 regular NBA season
was shorter than the usual 82 games. To make the analysis of marginal revenue consistent,
winning percentages are converted to Win82. It is defined as numbers of games won out
of 82 games played, which only differs from observed wins in the 2011/12 season.8 Figure
3.11 shows that wins in the NBA are normally distributed. The normality is also observed
in the distribution of team win score, which is simply the summation expected WS of
every player in the particular season’s roster, as presented in Figure 3.12.9 The team that
has highest WS in the sample is the Golden State Warriors in the 2014/15 season which
won the NBA championship in that season. A 90.18% significant correlation between the
team WS and Win82 indicates that the expected performance is highly correlated with the
actual performance. Figure 3.13 shows a scatter plot between the two variables.
Figure 3.14 illustrates a positive relationship between team revenue and its perfor-
mance. This indicates that teams with higher revenue usually win more often, although
the correlation is only 25.39%. On the other hand, 21.56% correlation is predicted for team’s
total revenue and Team WS. This implies that there is a slight positive relationship between
teams’ revenue and the cumulative expected performance of players in the rosters. Figure
3.15 presents this relationship. The weak correlation may be a result of outliers in the
sample. As can be seen at the upper left corner of both figures, there are teams that, despite
having high revenue, suffer from poor performance. There are two possible reasons: fan
royalty keeps the team revenue high even the teams do not perform well; or these teams
have poor resource allocation and spend too much money on bad players. Since the
correlation do not imply causality, the outliers can be from either cause.
7The figure does not take in consideration the inflation because economy-wide inflation has remained quite
low throughout the sample period.
8It should be noted that Win82 and WS are numbers of victories per season. While Win82 denotes team’s
actual wins, WS is estimated wins contributed by a player. By adding up roster players’ WS, team WS can be
estimated.




WSjt, where player j to k play for team i in season t.
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Figure 3.10: Histogram of NBA teams total revenue
Figure 3.11: Histogram of win82 in the NBA
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Figure 3.12: Histogram of team win score
Figure 3.13: Scatter plot of NBA teams’ expected and actual performance
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Figure 3.14: Scatter plot of NBA teams’ revenue and win82
Figure 3.15: Scatter plot of NBA teams’ revenue and teams’ win score
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The winner’s curse appears if MC is greater than MR. In other words, if α1 from the
estimation in salary equation (Equation 3.7) is greater than β1 in the revenue equation
(Equation 3.8), then there is an evidence of the winner’s curse.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Marginal Cost of Win
This study applies win score (WS) of Berri (2008) as the performance measurement of
players. The main reason is because it is directly measuring the contribution to wins of
each player that can be directly interpreted as player’s marginal product. In the process of
calculation for WS, WP48 is estimated. WP48 is defined as wins produce per 48 min and is
evaluated from performance statistics. A player’s WS is the actual wins produced by that
player in that season which is WP48 divided by 48 and multiplied by the actual minutes
played. 10
The performance of current season and the season before of NBA players are signif-
icantly correlated with each other (70% for WS and 72% for WP48). In this study, the
contact-length average WP48 is used for calculation of expected WS and is assumed to
be common knowledge among teams. Teams are also assumed to have already planned
ahead of the season how much time each player will be playing. As a result, WS is known
to teams. The variance of performance is assumed to be common knowledge, but the
uncertainty in actual performance remains.
The offered wage is a function of performance, variance of performance, and other
players’ characteristics.
Salaryi =β0 + β1WSi + β2VarWSi + β3(WSi × Stari) + β4Agei+














where Salary is player’s salary, WS is expected win score calculated from average WP48,
VarWS is variance of win score, Age is player’s age at the beginning of the season when
the contract was signed, Exp is experience in the major league at the beginning of the
10For the complete steps, see Appendix D.
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season when the contract was signed, Ht is player’s height in inches, Wt is player’s weight
in pounds, Star is the dummy variable for star player (= 1 if player appeared in the
roster of the all-star game during the contract at least once), Pos is dummies for positions
(where power guard is the base group in this study), Year is the year at which the contract
was signed, and Team is the team-specific dummy. The heteroskedasticity is observed,
and hence, the robust standard errors are implemented.11 The result of the regression is
presented in Table 3.2. The estimated coefficient of Year and Team are not presented in the
table to conserve space.
The model can explain approximately 45.35% of the the variation in salary. This indi-
cates that there is an ample room for other factors considered by team when determining
players’ wage. The use of salary to compare with the marginal revenue product of players
in earlier studies of the winner’s curse, hence, might not be appropriate.
From the regression, Age, Weight, and Position dummies except for center are not
statistically significant. On average, as nonstar player’s win score increases by one game,
all else being equal, his salary is expected to increase by $236,315. To explicitly focus on
the “super star,” the players who received sizable contracts, the Star dummy is included
into the model along with the WS-Star interaction term. The estimated coefficient of both
terms are statistically significant. Star players receive a premium of $9,693,614, on average.
However, they are exploited on their superior performance as the WS-Star interaction term
shows a significant negative sign. Average star players produce 5.41 more wins than
average nonstar players.12 One can calculate that an average star player receives a total
of $7,510,094 as premium after discounting for their superior performance.
The variance variable is statistically significant and has a positive value. This follows
the winner’s curse theory that a greater uncertainty in the expected value of the product
leads to a higher bid. The correlation of WS and VarWS is positive significant at 53.90%
indicating that better players seem to be more inconsistent. In other words, there is a
performance streak for better players.
Age is statistically insignificant but Age2 is significant and negatively affect salary; this
11The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test’s chi-square is 148.35 at the 52 degree of freedom and p = 0.000.
12Average star player’s WS is 8.67 and average regular player’s WS is 3.26.
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Table 3.2: Regression of salary with robust standard errors
Variable Coef. Std.Err. t p > |t|
Win Score 236,314.77*** 54,626.18 4.33 0.00
Variance of Win Score 51,626.88** 20,885.17 2.47 0.01
Win Score × Star -403,608.18*** 135,941.31 -2.97 0.00
Age 967,098.58 811,076.98 1.19 0.23
Age2 -27,940.96** 13,737.09 -2.03 0.04
Experience 682,977.51*** 146,176.40 4.67 0.00
Height 231,392.35** 91,257.41 2.54 0.01
Weight 18,639.30 12,446.69 1.50 0.13
Dummy, star 9,693,614.43*** 1,200,673.88 8.07 0.00
Dummy, center -2,215,828.92** 1,052,580.50 -2.11 0.04
Dummy, power forward -1,520,160.86 925,184.45 -1.64 0.10
Dummy, small forward -795,136.81 708,917.63 -1.12 0.26
Dummy, shooting guard 43,710.89 553,666.29 0.08 0.94
Constant -25,727,118.36* 14848176.30 -1.73 0.08
R2 0.4535
Observations 691
indicates that older players receive lower pay which should be a result of lower expected
performance. The correlation of age and performance is -14.96% for the regular players
(but not significant for star players). Experience is positively significant. Height also have
a positive significant effect on wage.
3.4.2 Marginal Revenue of Win
One game produced by an average player is equal to a game produced by a star player.
As a result, the returns on wins for a team should be the same no matter who generates
wins. Hence, team-level data are used for the calculation of marginal wins value (MWV),
in contrast to the individual player data used in the calculation of the marginal cost. Het-
eroskedasticity was encountered but was corrected after using robust standard errors.13
The model for estimation is
TRit =α0 + α1Win82it + α2Win82it−1 + α3Popit + α4Capit+






13The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test’s chi-square with 15 degree of freedom is 395.03 and p = 0.000.
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where TRit is team total revenue, Win82it is number of wins per 82 games,14 Win82it−1
is the number of wins per 82 games from the previous season to capture the long-term
effect of wins, Popit is the market size measured by the population in the metropolitan
area where the team located, Capit is stadium capacity, Playo f fit is a dummy variable for
postseason appearance, Championit is the dummy variable for winning the championship
in that season, and Yeari is the dummies for years in the sample capturing the inflation and
industry growth (2005 is the base year). The regression output is in Table 3.3.
About 58% of the variation in team total revenue can be explained by the model. Most
of the explanatory variables are statistically significant. Market size and stadium capacity
both have positive influence on total revenue. Being in the playoff does not affect team
revenue. Team performance does have a positive impact on team revenue across both
current and the immediate following seasons.
The marginal effect of Win82 on team revenue from the previous season is even more








where δ is the discount rate. Assume that the discount rate is 5%, an extra win generates
$1,042,109 to the team per season.
3.4.3 Is There a Winner’s Curse in the NBA Players Market?
To discover the winner’s curse, previous studies usually compare player’s MRP to his
salary. If salary exceeds MRP, they conclude that the winner’s curse exists. For NBA
players, the MRPs can be calculated by multiplying WS with MWV of $1,042,109. Using
a one-sided paired t-test for the null hypothesis that salary is equal to MRP against the
alternative hypotheses that salary is smaller and greater than MRP, respectively, we reject
the null hypothesis that salary is equal to MRP, but rather is greater than MRP (p = 0.0000);
but cannot reject the null hypothesis that salary is equal to MRP when the alternative
hypothesis states that salary is less than MRP (p = 1.0000). As a result, using salary-MRP
14To capture the impact of the lockout in the 2011/2012 season that shortened the regular season to only 66
games.
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Table 3.3: Regression of total revenue with robust standard errors
Variable Coef. Std.Err. t p > |t|
Win82t 486,639.74** 207,166.45 2.35 0.02
Win82t−1 583,242.03*** 121,586.33 4.80 0.00
Market size 3.90*** 0.61 6.40 0.00
Stadium capacity 4,944.86*** 1,121.24 4.41 0.00
Dummy, playoff 959,399.98 4,858,958.04 0.20 0.84
Dummy, champion 15,825,753.89*** 4,596,913.50 3.44 0.00
Dummy, 2015 61485814.93*** 8,377,452.17 7.34 0.00
Dummy, 2014 51,790,882.02*** 6,582,970.97 7.87 0.00
Dummy, 2013 44,244,788.11*** 7,048,305.76 6.28 0.00
Dummy, 2012 15,216,538.08*** 5,888,741.08 2.58 0.01
Dummy, 2011 24,573,270.88*** 5,939,553.02 4.14 0.00
Dummy, 2010 19,850,993.00*** 5,814,125.03 3.41 0.00
Dummy, 2009 19,204,125.18** 5,911,644.16 3.25 0.00
Dummy, 2008 18,612,060.54** 5,827,442.17 3.19 0.00
Dummy, 2007 12,427,629.88** 5,878,378.59 2.11 0.04
Dummy, 2006 5,834,063.22 5,741,423.71 1.02 0.31
Constant -53,074,811.83** 22,471,120.37 -2.36 0.02
R2 0.5799
Observations 329
comparison, the conclusion follows previous literature that the winner’s curse does exist
in the free-agent NBA players market.
Consider the cost-revenue of WS by comparing the marginal cost and marginal rev-
enue, the conclusion is different. The marginal cost of WS is the amount of money teams
spend to acquire an extra win generated by players. It is the same as the marginal effect
of WS on player’s salary. The marginal revenue is the return in dollar term a team would
earn if they win one more game in the season. It is the marginal effect of Win82 on team’s
total revenue which is calculated to be $1,042,109 per win.
The estimated coefficient of WS from the regression is tested against a null hypothesis
that βWS ≤ 1, 042, 109. At the 5% level, we fail to reject the null hypothesis (p = 1.0000).
As a result, teams, on average, spend less than what they get from an extra win. In other
words, teams actually realized the true value of players and can eventually exercise their
monopsony power to lower the salary below players’ actual value.
Since teams determine salaries by including the uncertainty component, namely vari-
ance of WS into consideration, one should not draw any conclusion about winner’s curse
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without taking in consideration this factor. The median of variance of WS is 8.79 means
than, for an average player with regular variance in performance, the winner’s curse
occurs if βWS + 8.79βVarWS > 1, 042, 109. At the 5% level, the single tail t-test for the
null hypothesis that βWS + 8.79βVarWS ≤ 1, 042, 109 fails to reject the null hypothesis (p
= 0.9550). Again, with the inclusion of uncertainty variable, there is still no evidence that
teams are victims of the winner’s curse.
Average star player receives $8,748,409 as a premium while the 5.65 extra wins gener-
ated by an average star player provide his team 1, 042, 109× 5.65 = $5,887,916. One might
conclude that the winner’s curse does exist here. However, star players normally not only
generate revenue to his team only through extra wins created. Autographs, souvenirs,
jerseys, and so forth. of star players can create more money to the team. Due to the
lack of detailed information about team revenue, this part of income cannot be estimated.
However, it is likely that another 42% of the revenue that cannot be explained by marginal
revenue model in this study will include star player indirect revenue. With this in mind,
the winner’s curse has less probability to occur under this circumstance.
The two findings are in conflict. Comparing only MRP and salary, teams fall in the
winner’s curse trap. However, it might not be reasonable to conclude that teams over-
estimate the value of players since another evidence suggests that they actually realize
the true value and even pay players less than they should. The reason that salaries are
greater than expected benefit of players can be because of other nonperformance player’s
characteristics and negotiation from the player union. Berri, Leeds, and von Allmen (2015)
present that players are paid for something else besides wins, namely bargaining power.
This power comes from the player union that has been successfully negotiating over team’s
fixed revenues such as those from broadcasting rights, a portion that is not included in the
revenue function. The estimated bargaining power is computed by subtracting player’s
average salary by estimated MRP. In this study, the estimated bargaining power of free-
agent players is $2,938,109, less than the estimation of $3,877,737 by Berri et al. (2015).
This is supported by another regression of the a function, ln(Team Payroll)it = β0 +
β1 ln(Team Revenueit).15 A 1% increase in team revenue, all else equal, is expected to
15The result is not reported.
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increase team’s payroll by 0.37%.
Berri et al. (2015) argue that the bargaining power equalized salaries with MRP. In this
study, although the estimated bargaining power is almost 50% smaller than what was
presented in Berri et al. (2015), the effect of the labor union and its bargaining power
seems to be greater beyond just equalizing salaries to MRP. Instead, it raises salaries above
MRP. This might sound illogical that team owners would allow this to happen. However,
consider that players do not only create revenue through wins. Star players can bring more
fans to the stadium. Their numbers on the jersey, their signatures, their photographs, and
so forth, can be sold as team merchandise. These also generate dollars to team. As a result,
the real bargaining power should be even less than the figure estimated.
It is also possible that the estimated bargaining power of the free agents comes from
exploitation of wins generated by the not-free agent players. Many players in the roster
have less than 6 years of experience and are bonded with contracts that are usually com-
pensated at the minimum wage. As of the 2015/16 season, a rookie’s minimum salary
is $525,093 and the minimum salary for a player with 5 years of experience is $1,100,602.
If a player generates only 1 win to his team, his value should at least be $1,268,327 if
teams set wages equal to his MRP. The average nonstar player in this study is $5,932,277.
Considering this possibility, a part of the extra pay players receive as free agents is to
compensate the exploited salary when they were not-free agents. This lowers the dollar
gains from bargaining power even further.
There are other costs necessary to generate wins beside payrolls such as managerial
expenses, stadium maintenance costs, and so forth. As a result, the estimated MC of wins
might be too low. However, this part of the cost is beyond the responsibility of players;
although, teams could pass these costs onto players and lower their pays.
3.5 Conclusion
This study examines the market for free-agent NBA players whether there is a winner’s
curse problem or not. The characteristics of NBA free-agent player market deem appro-
priate for the study of the winner’s curse. Previous studies on the winner’s curse in major
sports industry often compare salaries with MRPs. Most conclude that salary is greater
than MRP, and hence, the winner’s curse exists.
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In labor economics, it is assumed that wage is equal to marginal cost of labor and that
a firm will maximize benefit by equalizing marginal cost to marginal revenue product of
labor. While the latter part of this assumption is still theoretically correct, in the real world,
the former part is not applicable as wages are normally determined by many factors. This
study argues that salaries of NBA players are not solely determined by performance, but
also other players’ characteristics. As a result, it is not appropriate to directly compare
salary with MRP, which is only estimated from the player’s performance. Instead, the
comparison between marginal cost and marginal revenue of win is applied.
Using the traditional method of salary-MRP comparison, it follows previous literature
that the winner’s curse exists. However, using the MC-MR comparison, this study dis-
covers that teams indeed reward players less than the revenue they generated to teams,
even after include the tendency for winner’s curse such as the returns to variance of
performance. Although there is no clear evidence, it seems likely that it is the same for
star players. The winner’s curse theory indicates that the winner of the bidding war
“overestimated” the true value of product. As evidence presented in this study suggests,
there is no evidence of such overestimation. Hence, this study concludes that there is no
winner’s curse problem in the bids for NBA free-agent players.
There still exists a positive difference between salary and MRP. One possible reason
is that a part of the salary is determined by other players’ characteristics that do not
directly contribute to wins, such as age, experience, height, super star status, and so forth.
Another possible factor is the bargaining power over team’s fixed revenue, for example,
TV broadcasting right income, that is, by agreement of the league and the NBA labor
union, shared between teams and players. The extra wage above MRP can be a form
of compensation that teams provide to players for a lower-than-MRP salary paid when
players are not yet free agents. Teams could also pass other costs necessary to generate
wins besides players such as managerial cost onto players and lower their wages.
Despite seemingly not being the cause of the winner’s curse, star players are exploited
from their contributions. The better performance of the star players, the more exploita-
tion persists. This contradicts the economics of superstars theory by Rosen (1981), that
return on performance increases in a nonlinear fashion. Future research can focus on the
discovery of the relationship between player’s characteristics to wins or performance, that
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has always been assumed to be constants. This will enable the possibility of monetary
evaluation of player’s characteristics that helps improve the precision of the estimation for
player’s marginal revenue product besides just from performance. It could, in turn, yield
a more precise conclusion about the winner’s curse through a more accurate expectation
of benefit teams would have gained from players, since not every position requires same
type of player.
CHAPTER 4
ADVERTISING BEHAVIOR IN THE U.S. SKI
INDUSTRY: AN APPLIED CONJOINT
ANALYSIS METHOD
4.1 Introduction
The interest of advertising behaviors in business has been studied in numerous adver-
tising research, although, in the past thirty years, this field of study has not received much
attention from economists. Moul (2006) suggests that the omission of advertising can cause
substantial biases in estimation of factors determining market demand.
Advertising is one of the marketing tools used to compete for consumers’ attention.
Nowadays, the expansive usage of customer and market research makes customers’ pref-
erence predictability more accurate. However, the market is competitive and there are
several firms that are trying to reach out to customers. The approach and timing of com-
munication has become the main sources of sale expansion. These are all depending on
the ability of the firms to advertise. Competition for customers leads to a more intense
advertising competition.
Comanor and Wilson (1974) state that the content of advertising is not as important as
the fact that a product or brand is well advertised. This reflects in customers choosing a
well-known, highly advertised, but expensive brand over an unknown, little advertised,
cheaper one. Nelson (1970, 1974) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984) explain that this could
be the result of the change in demand elasticities which depend on the range of alternative
products for which quality of information is available. In a market where quality of
product cannot be observed, advertising is a tool to persuade customers to believe that the
advertised product is the better one. Prasad and Sethi (2004) explain that firms advertise
in order to maximize their profit while also considering the actions of the competitor
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dynamically, due to the carry-over effect of advertising (the advertising spending today
will continue to influence sales several months down the line).
The U.S. ski industry is selected as a case study for this research. Although there are
many branches of businesses under the snow sports industry, this study pays attention
only to ski and snowboard resorts. The ski resort industry is highly competitive. The
concentration ratio of industry is considered to be at a medium level. Vail Resorts Inc. is the
leader in the market with a market share of 29.3%, followed by the Intrawest Corporation
(10.0%), Boyne Resorts (8.7%), and the Powdr Corporation (5.7%). The rest 46.3% goes
to other small operators. The industry has been consolidated as large operators continue
buying individual resorts or send small operators out of business. Accessibility to capital
becomes an obstacle to small business since ski resorts have to deal with the uncertainty
of weather condition, requiring the cost of installing snow making equipment. The ski
resort industry is characterized by significant barriers to entry because of high initial costs,
high capital intensity, and limitation of ski areas, which is constrained by environmental
regulations. It is expected that over the next five years, the number of small operators
will decline, while the bigger companies enjoy the benefits from economies of scale (Yang,
2012).
Approximately 8% of the total revenue of ski resorts goes to marketing expenses includ-
ing advertising (Yang, 2012). The advertising performance depends on the media used,
the message delivered, the markets targeted, and the dollar invested (Strategic Marketing
& Research, Inc, 2013). Since it is costly, advertising is expected to be able to raise the
demand (L. Pepall, Richards, & Norman, 2005, Chapter 20). The difference in size of
capital between firms can impact the ability of the firms to expand their advertising and
can, in turn, constrain the ability to compete in the business. According to Kaldor (1950),
advertising scales economies exist and big firms are better able to finance large advertising
expenditure, which promotes greater industry’s concentration.
This study tries to examine differences in advertising behavior by focusing on two
groups of ski resorts, big and small, around the U.S. especially on the differences in ad-
vertising behavior due to the ability to access to capital between the two sample groups.
The main purpose is to explore whether advertising ability could be one of the reasons for
industry consolidation or not.
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This study is a supply-side study and the analysis involves the decision-making pro-
cess of the resorts, instead of a demand-side study which pays attention to consumers’
behavior, which is an area that has long been neglected. The following section describes
the methodology and sample used in this study. The third section provides results of the
study. The conclusion and recommendation are in the last section.
4.2 Approach
4.2.1 Methodology
This study applies the choice-based conjoint analysis (CBC) or discrete conjoint model.
The CBC conjoint analysis is adapted and used to study the behavior of firms instead of
consumers. The estimation used in this study is multinomial logit analysis (MNL). More
details on the conjoint analysis and the MNL estimation can be found in Appendix E.
4.2.2 Sample
The respondents in this study are ski resorts’ experts or persons in charge of making
advertising decisions. Since the study pays attention to the advertising behavior of the
firms, the marketing managers, advertising managers, or general managers are in the focus
group. The identity of each resort and respondent is coded and kept confidential to ensure
anonymity of participants.
There were 482 ski resorts under 340 businesses in the U.S. as of year 2012 (Yang,
2012). The questionnaire was sent to 152 individuals who are in charge of making the
advertising decisions of each ski resort and are reachable by e-mail. The conjoint tasks
were performed and the data were collected using third-party software (Sawtooth). At the
end of the survey, 22 responses were received, of which only 19 are valid.
Based on the data screening criteria suggested in Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and
Tatham (2005), 2 respondents were eliminated because both answered the questions using
“straight line” pattern (always selected choice 1). This corresponds with the data obtained
by the software used in this study that both of them spend approximately 3 s per task
which does not seem possible considering the amount of information presented in each
task.
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Out of the remaining qualified 17 respondents, 4 did not complete the entire survey.
However, these respondents were kept in the utility estimation. Only the 13 respondents
who completed the entire survey were used in the calculation of the “hit rate,” which is
the test for checking the accuracy of predictions.
4.2.3 Conjoint Tasks
The respondents were asked to answer general questions related to their businesses,
such as the size of their resorts, services provided in their resorts, location of their resorts,
and so forth.1 In Appendix F, the characteristics of the resorts that participated in this
analysis is summarized.
A total of 15 choice tasks were presented to each respondent after completing the
general questions. Each task contained three conjoint profiles. The question asked at
the beginning of each conjoint task was: “If you were considering increasing your business’
advertisement for this year and these were the only situations you face, which would be the most
likely scenario that you will choose to advertise more?”
The choice for not choosing to increase advertising was included in every choice set
as dual response task.2 This made the tasks more realistic without losing information and
the ability to estimate absolute and relative effects of each attribute (Haaijer, Kamakura, &
Widel, 2001).
After in-depth interviews with industry’s experts (n = 7), four attributes are considered
in this study. A low number of attributes could lead to an unrealistic the conjoint task.
However, in-depth interviews with ski resorts’ representatives and experts in the industry
suggest that these are the only factors the ski resorts pay attention to when it comes to ad-
vertising decisions. Each attribute is divided into five levels based on in-depth interviews
and industry reports (Yang, 2012) to be as realistic as possible as listed in Table 4.1. These
levels are used in the factorial designed profiles and estimated separately as individual
variables.
1See Appendix G.
2First, the respondents were asked to choose the best choice among the presented profiles. After that, they
were asked whether the respondents will really choose to increase advertising if the situations in that choice
sets really are only situations in real world where they have an option of not increasing advertisement.
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Table 4.1: Attributes and levels used for the conjoint analysis
Attributes Levels
Total revenue of last season compared to the Increased by 3%




Snow quantity of the resort compared to average 3 in. above average
snow falls this season (SQ) 5 in. above average
3 in. below average
5 in. below average
Same as average
Number of times you see advertisement of Increases by 20%
competitors in the current season compared to Increases by 50%
last season (RA) Decreases by 20%
Decreases by 50%
Does not change
Average cost of advertising media that the Increases by 10%
resort is currently using or planning to use this Increases by 25%
season compared to last season (CA) Decreases by 10%
Decreases by 25%
Does not change
Total revenue is one of the main factors affecting the advertising expenditure decision.
In this study, total revenue means the total revenue of last season in comparison to the
season before. It has two possible causalities: an increase in total revenue raises the
possible budget for advertising, or an increase in advertising expenditure brings about
a higher total revenue. Lambin (1976) finds that the latter causality flow dominates the
former one. Brand advertising shows a positive impact on a brand’s current and future
sales and/or market share. This conclusion is consistent with previous literature, such as
Nerlove and Waugh (1961) and Telser (1962). Although, Lambin also finds that there is a
strong evidence of a decreasing return to advertising factors.
There are two possible hypotheses regarding total revenue. First, if the firms set ad-
vertising expenditures as a proportion of total revenue of last season, total revenue should
have a positive relationship with the possibility of an increase in advertising expenditures.
Second, a negative relationship should be observed if the firms react to a decline in total
revenue of last season by expanding advertising expenditures. According to resorts repre-
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sentatives, many resorts have pretty stable marketing expenses overtime. As a result, it is
more reasonable to predict that the latter hypothesis will be more likely the case.
Snow condition of each season is said to be one of the most important factors in ad-
vertising, according to in-depth interviews. Some ski resorts claim that the ability to
make artificial snow by snowmaking technology could reduce the uncertainty in snow
conditions so they do not make advertising decisions based on snowfall. However, the
majority of resorts state that snow quantity plays a significant role in advertising decisions.
So, it is possible that the region where ski resorts are located determines the advertising
behavior in regard to snowfall. The prediction is that, since big operators have better
technology and an ability to afford the cost of snowmaking, they will not be as sensitive to
snow conditions as small resorts are.
Lambin (1976) finds a negative relationship between rival brand advertising on the
firm’s sales or market share. He concludes that there are competitive tendencies in adver-
tising. Unlike cartel prices, agreement on advertising behavior is difficult to secure. Also,
positive advertising reaction elasticities are observed, which indicates the interdependence
among brand advertising policies (Clarke, 1973; Grabowski & Mueller, 1971; Lambin, 1976;
Telser, 1962). The reason is that advertising makes consumers less loyal to a brand (Telser,
1964). As a result, the rivals’ advertising attribute is included into this model. To be
more specific, instead of using rivals’ expenditure on advertising, which is unknown to
the resorts, according to representatives from ski resorts, the change in numbers of rival
resorts’ ads seen by the company is used in this study. The assumption is that if an
operator sees that his or her competitors increase their advertising, he or she should do the
same to avoid losing market share, if he or she thinks that it is possible to compete with
them. In other words, if the competitors are of the same size of business, the competition
among resorts should be more intense. On the other hand, some representatives from
small ski resorts state that there is no point for them to compete with bigger ski resorts by
advertising because they do not have the same capital as the bigger resorts do. As a result,
the hypothesis on the rival’s advertisement for this study is that the big resorts should be
more competitive than the small resorts due to a more flexible capital.
Since this research focuses on decision-making process of the firms, the principles
of microeconomic theory suggest that costs of production are main factors affecting the
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supply–including the supply for advertising (L. Pepall et al., 2005, Chapter 20). It should be
noted here that the cost of advertising means the cost of particular channels of communica-
tion the resorts use to send their messages to the customers, for example, the cost of prime
time in radio advertising. It is the cost of advertising media that each resort is currently
using or planning to use if the cost is to be lower. These channels can be different among
resorts since some of them might spend more on radio advertising, some on magazines,
some on online social networks and some on television channels. It is expected that the
smaller businesses would be less cost sensitive than the bigger ones since they mostly rely
on cheap social network, local newspaper, or radio advertising while the big businesses
invest more in costly advertising channel, such as television and global magazines.
4.3 Estimations and Results
In this study, two estimation approaches are conducted: counting analysis and multi-
nomial logit estimation (MNL). Out of the 15 tasks asked to each respondent, 3 tasks are
exactly the same while other 12 are randomly assigned to each respondent. The difference
tasks presented to each respondent helps increase the information about preferences. The
results presented in this section are estimated using 12 random tasks. The 3 tasks which
are called “holdouts” are used later on to test the validity of the models.
4.3.1 Counting Analysis
The counting method is a quick way to summarize the results of choice data. The
number of times an attribute level was chosen as a ratio of the number of times it was
available in choice tasks will show the preference of each level in the same attribute. It
provides the information that is closely related to the conjoint utilities. Although it should
be noted that random imbalances in the design can distort count ratios if the sample size
is small, which is the main problem of this study.
The 2-way and 3-way interaction effects from the counting analysis are also estimated
but none of them are statistically significant and, hence, are not considered for the analysis.
The null hypothesis is that the resorts do not make their advertisement base on the pre-
sented factor. In other words, when making decision, resorts pay attention on each factor
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separately. Table 4.2 summarizes the main effect results. The second column demonstrates
the counting ratio, the number of times each level was chosen over the number of times it
appeared as an option, of the whole sample.
Consider the chi-square statistics for each attribute, only the “cost of advertising” at-
tribute is statistically significant at the 1% level. The null hypothesis is that the difference
between the counting ratio of each level within the same attribute is equal to zero. The
preference between levels in the cost of advertising attribute is statistically different from
one level to other levels. For other attributes, the counting ratio shows that there are no
significant difference in the preference of each level in the same attribute. In other words,
there is no significant difference in the number of times an attribute level was chosen as a
ratio of the number of times it was available in choice tasks.
The last two columns present the counts of two separated groups of ski resorts, cate-
gorized by the size of the resorts.3 The two groups of resorts have similar results as the
aggregated one. The chi-square statistics point out that the cost attributes are statistically
significant at the 5% level for the small size group and significant at the 1% level for the
big size group. Other attributes are all statistically insignificant.
It can be interpreted that, for ski resorts, either big or small, all the levels of last season’s
total revenue, the quantity of snow, and the amount of competitors’ advertising are equally
important for the ski resorts to take in consideration when they are making advertising
decisions. The change from one level to another within the three attribute does not sig-
nificantly change the advertising decisions. It worth mentioning here that the conjoint
analysis builds on the assumption that every attribute included in the model is important.
As a result, an insignificant statistic of the difference between the levels in each attribute
does not mean that the attribute is not an important factor when making decisions.
The main factor that affects the advertising behavior of ski resorts is the cost of advertis-
ing media. Both groups, small and big resorts, show that a decrease in cost of advertising
raises the possibility of an increase in advertising. The greater the reduction in cost of
advertising channels, the higher probability for small ski resorts to raise their advertising.
3NSAA uses vtf/h (lift capacity per hour) to classify ski resorts into 4 sizes. In this study, the small and
medium small size resorts are combined and called small resorts while the medium-large and large resorts are
grouped as big resorts. There are 12 small resorts and 5 big resorts according to this categorization.
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Table 4.2: Counting analysis
Variable
Counting Ratio
Total (17) Small (12) Big (5)
Total revenue of last season compared to previous season
Increased by 3% 0.371 0.342 0.393
Increased by 10% 0.333 0.342 0.333
Decreased by 3% 0.330 0.295 0.375
Decreased by 10% 0.333 0.356 0.400
Did not change 0.301 0.333 0.182
Within Attribute Chi-Square 0.743 0.496 3.137
D.F. 4 4 4
Significance not sig not sig not sig
Snow quantity of this season compared to average
3 in. above 0.240 0.263 0.194
5 in. above 0.299 0.347 0.219
3 in. below 0.370 0.316 0.467
5 in. below 0.434 0.395 0.452
Same as average 0.323 0.346 0.345
Within Attribute Chi-Square 6.421 2.133 5.990
D.F. 4 4 4
Significance not sig not sig not sig
Rivals’ advertisement in this season compared to last season
Increases by 20% 0.364 0.355 0.387
Increases by 50% 0.408 0.392 0.467
Decreases by 20% 0.306 0.316 0.276
Decreases by 50% 0.299 0.282 0.333
Does not change 0.286 0.316 0.200
Within Attribute Chi-Square 3.213 1.645 3.756
D.F. 4 4 4
Significance not sig not sig not sig
Cost of advertising in this season compared to last season
Increases by 10% 0.212 0.213 0.194
Increases by 25% 0.165 0.231 0.121
Decreases by 10% 0.469 0.382 0.633
Decreases by 25% 0.505 0.500 0.483
Does not change 0.327 0.347 0.267
Within Attribute Chi-Square 27.161 12.439 16.714
D.F. 4 4 4
Significance p<.01 p<.05 p<.01
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A smaller decline in the cost of advertising, on the other hand, seems more tempting for
big resorts to increase their advertisement in comparison to their smaller counterparts.
This could be because the bigger resorts spend more on expensive advertising media and,
thus, a small decrease in percentage means a big drop in dollar term for them.
4.3.2 Multinomial Logit Analysis
There are 4 attributes with 5 levels each, as a result, 5× 4 = 20 path-worth utilities
are estimated. The last level of each attribute are dropped off to prevent the problem of
perfect collinearity. Hence, only 20− 4 = 16 dummy variables representing 16 levels are
included in the model. Also, the “none” response is included as another dummy variable
in order to correct the magnitude and reduce the bias of estimators. As a result, 16+ 1 = 17
parameters are estimated. It should be noted here that the path-worth utilities that are
calculated and rescaled so that the summation of all utilities in the same attribute will be
zero. This makes it possible to find the path-worth utilities of all the drop-off variables.4
One might worry about the overfitting problem because of the small sample size. How-
ever, in the MNL estimation, each choice task is treated as one sample. As a result, the total
observation for this study is approximately equal to the number of respondent multiplies
by the number of random tasks 17× 12 = 204.
Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 provide information from MNL regressions of the whole sam-
ple, small resorts group, and big resorts group, respectively. The chi-square statistics of
the three models for any iteration5 pass the significance test (all greater than the critical
values), which suggests that the models provide a good fit to the data, and thus, the model
is valid. The null hypothesis for the test is that the explanatory variables are together not
explaining the explained variable.
The estimated coefficient parameter of each level (in the “Effect” column) can be inter-
preted as an average path-worth utility for the sample group. This is based on the assump-
tion that the respondents are homogeneous. For the whole sample, 5 parameters reject the
4For more information about the MNL regression, see Appendix E.
5An iteration is a selection of the first attribute level used to begin the MNL estimation. For more
information, see Appendix E.
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Table 4.3: Multinomial logit estimation (aggregated)






Log-likelihood for this model -267.1207
Log-likelihood for null model -305.6414
38.5207
Percent Certainty 12.6032
Consistent Akaike Infor Criterion 644.0544
Chi-Square 77.0415
Relative Chi-Square 4.5319
Variable Effect Std Error t Ratio
Total revenue of last season compared to previous season
Increased by 3% 0.2233 0.1808 1.2352
Increased by 10% -0.0670 0.1884 -0.3558
Decreased by 3% -0.0107 0.1838 -0.0580
Decreased by 10% 0.1146 0.1858 0.6168
Did not change -0.2602 0.1851 -1.4059
Snow quantity of this season compared to average
3 in. above -0.3733 0.1974 -1.8912
5 in. above -0.0342 0.1925 -0.1777
3 in. below 0.2688 0.1779 1.5114
5 in. below 0.3550* 0.1698 2.0908
Same as average -0.2163 0.1828 -1.1829
Rivals’ advertisement in this season compared to last season
Increases by 20% 0.0994 0.1751 0.5676
Increases by 50% 0.2581 0.1724 1.4967
Decreases by 20% -0.2480 0.1898 -1.3069
Decreases by 50% 0.0063 0.1881 0.0334
Does not change -0.1157 0.1893 -0.6114
Cost of advertising in this season compared to last season
Increases by 10% -0.5122* 0.2076 -2.4670
Increases by 25% -0.8138** 0.2247 -3.6210
Decreases by 10% 0.6622** 0.1726 3.8365
Decreases by 25% 0.6810*** 0.1665 4.0915
Does not change -0.0172 0.1812 -0.0948
None 0.9526*** 0.1663 5.7294
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Table 4.4: Multinomial logit estimation (small resorts)






Log-likelihood for this model -191.9761
Log-likelihood for null model -218.4612
326.4851
Percent Certainty 12.1235
Consistent Akaike Infor Criterion 488.1606
Chi-Square 52.9702
Relative Chi-Square 3.1159
Variable Effect Std Error t Ratio
Total revenue of last season compared to previous season
Increased by 3% 0.1688 0.2098 0.8046
Increased by 10% -0.0085 0.2247 -0.0380
Decreased by 3% -0.1540 0.2188 -0.7041
Decreased by 10% 0.0361 0.2269 0.1590
Did not change -0.0423 0.2125 -0.1992
Snow quantity of this season compared to average
3 in. above -0.2693 0.2287 -1.1777
5 in. above 0.0780 0.2270 0.3434
3 in. below 0.0885 0.2194 0.4034
5 in. below 0.3101 0.2030 1.5276
Same as average -0.2072 0.2168 -0.9556
Rivals’ advertisement in this season compared to last season
Increases by 20% 0.0621 0.2100 0.2959
Increases by 50% 0.1402 0.2046 0.6850
Decreases by 20% -0.1122 0.2248 -0.4991
Decreases by 50% -0.0998 0.2335 -0.4273
Does not change 0.0097 0.2172 0.0446
Cost of advertising in this season compared to last season
Increases by 10% -0.4586 0.2475 -1.8530
Increases by 25% -0.6445* 0.2578 -2.5006
Decreases by 10% 0.3462 0.2094 1.6531
Decreases by 25% 0.6409** 0.1920 3.3383
Does not change 0.1160 0.2126 0.5456
None 1.1347*** 0.1943 5.8396
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Table 4.5: Multinomial logit estimation (big resorts)







Log-likelihood for this model -59.5270
Log-likelihood for null model -87.1802
27.6532
Percent Certainty 31.7196
Consistent Akaike Infor Criterion 207.2781
Chi-Square 55.3064
Relative Chi-Square 3.2533
Variable Effect Std Error t Ratio
Total revenue of last season compared to previous season
Increased by 3% 0.4517 0.4439 1.0176
Increased by 10% -0.3305 0.4176 -0.7915
Decreased by 3% 0.4352 0.3939 1.1048
Decreased by 10% 0.6739 0.4054 1.6622
Did not change -1.2302* 0.4944 -2.4883
Snow quantity of this season compared to average
3 in. above -0.6745 0.4686 -1.4395
5 in. above -0.6838 0.4830 -1.4157
3 in. below 0.9130* 0.4230 2.1583
5 in. below 0.7528 0.3881 1.9398
Same as average -0.3075 0.4084 -0.7531
Rivals’ advertisement in this season compared to last season
Increases by 20% 0.3102 0.3697 0.8392
Increases by 50% 0.8082* 0.3921 2.0613
Decreases by 20% -0.8118* 0.4134 -1.9638
Decreases by 50% 0.2342 0.4283 0.5469
Does not change -0.5408 0.4546 -1.1896
Cost of advertising in this season compared to last season
Increases by 10% -0.3551 0.4589 -0.7738
Increases by 25% -1.6798** 0.5819 -2.8868
Decreases by 10% 1.7495*** 0.4078 4.2901
Decreases by 25% 1.1253** 0.4207 2.6750
Does not change -0.8400 0.4327 -1.9410
None 0.8049* 0.3698 2.1765
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null hypothesis that the attribute level individually does not contribute to the probability
of the resorts increasing their advertising and are statistically significant (excluding the
none option which is only included into the model for correcting the magnitude of utility
prediction): one from snow quantity attribute and four from cost of advertising attribute.
Snow quantity of the resort in the current season compared to average snowfall plays
an important role in advertising decisions only if it is 5 in. below average, ceteris paribus.
Although the other levels in this attribute are not statistically significant, the order of
estimated parameters provides some valuable information. On average, the resorts will
raise their advertising investments when the snow quantity is below average. This implies
that ski resorts use advertising to persuade skiers to come to their resorts during bad
weather condition periods rather than providing information about snowfall. In other
words, it seems that skiers find information about snow falls from other sources rather
than the resorts’ advertising. This is consistent with the information obtained from the
in-depth interviews that most resorts advertise more when there is little snow fall during
the season, meanwhile, there is no need to advertise when there is a good quantity of snow
since skiers will come to the resorts anyway.
The other 4 significant attribute levels are all from the cost of advertising attribute,
consistent with the result of counting analysis. The most influential level is when the
cost of advertising declines by 25%, followed by a 10% decrease, 10% increase, and 25%
increase, respectively. The order of estimated utilities illustrate a negative relationship
between the cost of advertising and the probability of increasing advertisements following
the law of demand.
Take a closer look at only the small resort group (12× 12 = 144 observations); only two
levels in the cost of advertising attribute are statistically significant: a 25% increase in cost
and a 25% decrease in cost. This implies that the advertising decisions of the small resorts
are quite arbitrary when it comes to other attributes beside cost. For the cost of advertising,
only a dramatic change in cost significantly impacts the advertising decisions.
It is a little more complicated for the big resorts’ advertising decisions (5× 12 = 60
observations). There are 7 variables that significantly affect the probability of resorts to
increase their advertising. All the attributes are taken into consideration at a different
degree. Last season’s total revenue becomes statistically significant only if it remained
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stable from the season before. If the revenue of last year did not change the big resorts tend
to lower their advertising. As for snow quantity, 3 in. below average brings about higher
advertising. This could be because of two possible reasons: first, the resorts advertise more
to increase the number of visitors in bad weather conditions when not many people want
to go skiing; second, they use snowmaking machines during bad weather periods and
want more income from skiers to compensate for the cost of making snow. The reason that
the “5 in. below average” level is not statistically significant could be that the big resorts
can take advantage of economies of scale if they have to make more artificial snow.
The number of competitors’ advertisements, although does not affect the small resorts
advertising decisions, positively influences the number of advertisement of the big resorts.
This illustrates an advertising competition behavior among big operators. The resorts tend
to increase their advertising when their rivals increase their ads by 50%. They do not
pay attention to a slight increase in number of competitors’ ads. As for a declining in
advertisement of competing resorts, it seems that the big operators only pay attention
when their rivals slightly reduce their ads and neglect a large change. This is somewhat
consistent with the information obtained from in-depth interviews that the advertising
budgets are quite stable. Although their rivals cut down the amount of advertisement, big
operators still continue publishing their ads as before. However, if they see a significant
increase in competitors’ advertisement, they tend to increase their advertising as well in
response.
The estimation for the cost of advertising parameters yields a similar result to those of
small resorts. A negative relationship is observed. A decrease in the cost of advertising
increases the chance for resorts to increase their ads. A big increase in advertisement
probability, due to a small drop in cost of advertising, could be that the cost of advertising
is more expensive for big operators as explained earlier. More evidence that the bigger
resorts have less financial constraints is that they do not pay much attention to a small
increase in the cost of advertising (a 10% increase in cost is statistically insignificant, all else
equal). Also, the magnitude of the estimated path-worth utilities for the significant levels
are all greater for the big resorts in comparison to those of the small resorts. However,
there is not enough information to explain why they prefer the “decreases by 10%” level
to “decreases by 25%” level. One explanation could be that there is a decreasing return to
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advertising factors as suggested by Lambin (1976). The big resorts will keep on increasing
their ads when the return on advertising is positiive until the return becomes zero. Another
possible explanation is that they do not need to increase expenditure much when cost
becomes lower while they can still increase ads.
From the preference score for each attribute presented in Table 4.6, the cost of adver-
tising attribute is again the factor considered to be the most important for both sample
groups.6 Although, for the big resorts, the cost of advertising is not as important as for
the small resorts. There is not much difference for the total revenue attribute among the
two sample groups. However, it can be seen that the big resorts pay more attention to
snow quantity and the amount of competitors’ ads. There are two implications here. First,
the big resorts tend to use advertising more than the small resorts when there is a change
in snow conditions. Combining with the path-worth utility found earlier, it seems that
the big resorts use advertising as a tool to increase customers when the snowfall is below
average. This could be because it is costly for them to use snowmaking equipment so they
need to increase the revenue to compensate the expense. Second, the big resorts are more
competitive than the small resorts and advertising is one of the tools used in competition.
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis made about the competitors’ advertising
attribute.
4.3.3 Prediction Ability of the Models
As mentioned earlier, 3 conjoint tasks among the 15 tasks assigned to each respondent
are the same. For utility estimations, only 12 random tasks are used. The 3 holdouts are
used for calculating the “hit rate,” which is a tool to check the precision of the model. The
basic idea is that the respondents should choose the profile that gives highest total utility
in each task. The total utility of each profile can be calculated from Equation 4.1.
uˆA = uˆiTRA + uˆiSQA + uˆiRAA + uˆiCAA; i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (4.1)
where uˆA is the predicted total utility of profile A and uˆi is the estimated path-worth utility
of level i of each attribute found from the MNL regression assigned to profile A.
6For more detail about preference score, see Appendix E.
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Total Revenue 19.96 22.22 22.27
Snow Quantity 19.76 11.56 18.68
Rivals’ Ads 12.41 13.68 18.95
Cost of Advertising 47.86 52.54 40.11
The 3 holdouts were combined in the same format as other random choice tasks and are
the same across the respondents. The profiles in each task are used for utility estimations.
Only 13 respondents completed all the holdouts, which are used in the calculation of hit
rates.
The profile that gives the highest utility among the 3 profiles in each task should
be selected by the respondent. The MNL assumes homogeneity, hence, the estimated
utilities are the same for the whole sample. Since the holdout tasks are the same for
every respondent, the predicted choices are also the same. For example, in holdout task
number 1, regardless of characteristics of ski resorts, the model predicts that every resort
will choose profile 2 which has the highest estimated utility.
If the respondent chooses the profile predicted by the model in the actual conjoint task,
it is counted as a “hit,” otherwise it is a “miss.” After the utility is computed, it is compared
to the utility of the “none” dual-response option to calculate the hit rate for the “none”
option.7 If the utility of the “none” option is higher than the utility of the highest-utility
profile, the respondent is forecasted to choose the “none” option after selecting one of the
three profiles thought to be the best choice for them.
The hit rates are presented in Table 4.7. The model has the prediction ability at 38.46%
after average across the 3 holdout tasks. The model best predicts the last holdout but worst
predicts the first holdout. On average, the model, although not very successful, has higher
predictability than one-third or 33.33% if the profile is to be chosen randomly.
As for the “none” responses, the model has a high hit rate for the second holdout
(84.61%). For the first and the third holdouts, the model also correctly forecasts the choice
7The utility for the none option is also calculated during the process of utility estimation but not interpreted
because there is no meaning of the none response by itself.
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at a higher than 25% rate (if the “none” response are to be chosen randomly, the respondent
will have a choice of choosing profile 1, 2, 3, and a “none” option). On average, the model
56.41% correctly predict the “none” response.
It should be noted here that the prediction abilities of the models are not very high
due to a small number of respondents and the homogeneity assumption. However, it
correctly predicts both profile selections and “none” response more than the randomly-
choose method.
4.4 Conclusion and Recommendation
This study aims to explore the differences in advertising behaviors of the U.S. ski
resorts using an applied CBC method. The conjoint tasks were designed based on in-depth
interviews with ski industry’s experts. The attributes included are total revenue of last
season, snow quantity, competitors’ advertisement, and cost of advertising media. Each
attributes are divided into 5 levels based on information gathered during the interviews
and industry reports. The resorts are separated into 2 groups, small and big, based on
vtf/h (lift capacity per hour).
The counting analysis suggests that there is no significant difference in the selection
ratio between levels within attributes of all the including attributes except for cost. This
indicates that all levels are selected with the same proportion for all attributes except cost.
Within the cost attribute, the lowest cost level (decreases by 25%) was chosen the most
often for the whole sample and the small ski resorts. Big resorts, however, select the
“decreases by 10%” the most often.
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The results of the multinomial logit regressions reveal quite similar conclusions. There
is no difference in the preference score of total revenue attribute of the two resort groups.
Meanwhile, the cost of advertising significantly impacts the advertising decisions for both
groups of sample. A negative cost-advertising possibility relationship is observed. The
small resorts pay more attention to cost of advertising than the big resorts do. For the small
resorts, only 2 levels of the cost attribute’s estimators are statistically significant. Both are
when there is a dramatic change in the cost of advertising. For the big resorts, 3 out of 5
levels of the cost attribute are statistically significant. There is a sign of a decreasing return
to advertising factors follows the finding of Lambin (1976). As for an increase in cost of
advertising, the big resorts only react to a large increase in cost (25%).
The big resorts seem to pay attention to various factors besides cost. They pay attention
to snow quantity when it is 3 in. below average. The higher probability of increasing
their advertisement when snow quantity is low could be that because the snowmaking
technology is costly and the resorts will need to compensate the cost with more customers.
They, however, do not pay much attention when the snow quantity is 5 in. below average.
The reason could be that because, although costly, snowmaking technology has economies
of scale and the resorts can produce artificial snow at a lower cost.
Furthermore, the preference score on rivals’ advertising indicates that the big resorts
pay attention on advertising competition while the small resorts do not. This follows the
hypothesis made prior to the estimation. According to the in-depth interviews, smaller
operators indicate that there is no need for them to pay attention to rivals’ advertising
behavior because they cannot raise their capital to compete in such competition anyway.
In conclusion, this study proves that size of ski resorts contribute to different advertis-
ing behaviors. The big resorts seem to face a lower budget constraint and are more likely
to use more expensive advertising media. They also tend to be more competitive than
the small resorts. The small resorts have higher budget constraints, are more sensitive to
cost changes, and cannot freely change their advertising decisions when there are changes
in important business factors such as snow quantity or amount of competitors’ advertise-
ment. However, there is no clear evidence that the expansion of big ski resort operators
will be harmful to competition in the industry in the perspective of advertising, except
only if the lack of advertising competition drives small operators out of business.
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The “hit rates” are calculated from 3 holdout tasks. The result suggests that the model
can better predict the choice than the randomly-choose method. The Chi-Square statistics
used for testing the validity of the model also suggest that, no matter which iteration used
for the estimation process, the model is valid. In other words, the independent variables
(attribute levels) can together statistically significantly explain the change in the dependent
variable (probability of an increase in advertisement).
In this study, the sample were only asked about the choice they would choose from the
sets of situations, which might not be realistic enough, since the real world phenomena is
a lot more complex than just four attributes and five levels. Also, the decision or intention
of the respondents might not be followed in the real situation. However, similar concerns
have also been taken in consideration in the marketing research field. Fortunately, it is
shown in many studies that the results of the conjoint analysis are quite accurate (Orme,
2013; Sawtooth Software, Inc., 2001), valid and reliable (Green & Srinivasan, 1978).
The main problem of this study is the issue of small sample size. Most of the ski resorts
do not want to provide the data or participate in the survey for various reasons. This
problem constrains the analysis in this study to only focus on the size of resorts instead
of other characteristics that might be important, such as region of the resorts. The future
research, if there is any, should probably be conducted by the ski industry itself or by
government to guarantee the higher participation rate. The future research can apply other
estimation methodologies, for example, hierarchical Bayes (HB) estimation, which allows
heterogeneity between businesses, which is widely used in recent conjoint analysis (How-
ell, 2009). If the number of participating resort increases, more analyses, such as factor
analysis or cluster analysis, could be conduct in order to see the affect of advertising of the
big resorts on the small resorts. This could help clarify the anticompetitive perspective of
advertising which is the main concern that has not been answered in this study.
APPENDIX A
STOCHASTIC FRONTIER ANALYSES
Consider a firm that produces only one output (y) using a vector of inputs (x), one can
write the input requirement set, the set of all input bundles that produce at least (positive)
y units of output, as followed.
V(y) = {x in Rn+ : (y,−x) is in Y}. (A.1)
The production function of a one-input firm can be defined as an inverse of input
requirement frontier.
f (x) = {y in R : y is the maximum output associated with − x in Y} (A.2)
A production plan y in Y is “technologically or technically efficient” if there is no y′ in
Y such that y′ ≥ y and y′ 6= y. In other words, there is no way to produce more output
with the same inputs or to produce the same output with less inputs than an efficient
production plan. From a production function, “isoquant” can be derived. This implies
that every input bundle on the isoquant is technological efficient.
The isoquant which gives all input bundles that produce exactly y units of output is the
technological efficient frontier. It can be defined as
Q(y) = {x in Rn+ : x is in V(y) and x is not in V(y′) f or y′ > y}. (A.3)
In an industry where different firms have different technologies (and production func-
tions), the industry production function is the most efficient production function. It is
considered the frontier of input requirement. Other (less efficient) production functions are
“output distance functions,” production technology of which output can still be radially
expanded at a given inputs level. Mathematically expressed, the production function
is f (x) = y/µ∗ where µ∗ = 1 for the efficient production on the isoquant (industry
production function) and µ∗ < 1 for the inefficient production (output distance function).
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Denote that w is a vector of input prices, the cost function is the minimal cost at the
input prices and output level, c(w, y) = wx(w, y). Consider a cost minimization problem
for a firm with a Cobb-Douglas technology y = Axa1x
b
2.
c(w, y) = min
x
{wx : x ∈ V(y)} (A.4)
The cost function is
















a+b ]w aa+b1 w ba+b2 y 1a+b . (A.5)
This expression implies that, at a given factor prices combination and a specific output
level, there will be an input combination that yield a lowest possible cost of production
(the cost efficient input combination). A firm that uses input combination that minimizes
cost of production is considered allocative efficient. Graphically, the cost-minimizing input
combination is the tangency point between the isoquant and the isocost. Recall that every
point on the isoquant is technologically efficient, there is only one tangency point along
the curve; hence, it is possible that a technologically efficient firm is not allocative efficient
if the acquired input combination is not at the tangency point.
For a technically inefficient firm, there exists a firm’s isoquant (which shall not be con-
fused with the industry isoquant) derived from the output distance function. A technically
inefficient firm can be allocative efficient if it uses an input combination at where the firm’s
isoquant is tangent with the given isocost.
If the cost frontier c(y, w) is differentiable with respect to input prices, then Shephard’s
lemma states that
x(y, w) = ∇wc(y, w). (A.6)
As a result, the vector of cost-minimizing input demand equation can be obtained as
the factor price gradient of the cost frontier. In other words, an allocative efficient firm
produces on the cost frontier where wx = c(y, w) and x = x(y, w), while an allocative
inefficient firm operates above the cost frontier where wx > c(y, w) and x 6= x(y, w).
Figure A.1 illustrates examples of the four cases of efficiencies. Every point on the
industry isoquant is considered “technically efficient.” As a result, both firm A and B are
technically efficient by definition, while firm C and D are technically inefficient. How-
ever, only firm A uses a cost-minimizing input combination and is considered “allocative
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Figure A.1: Four scenarios of efficiency
efficient”. Therefore, A is both technically and allocative efficient while B is technically
efficient but not allocative efficient. Assume that firm C and D share the same (output
distance) production function that have the same isoquant. Only C operates where the iso-
quant and isocost is tangent with each other. Hence, C is, although technically inefficient,
allocative efficient. Meanwhile D is neither technically nor allocative efficient. It should be
noted that the isocosts have the same slope, which implies that factor prices are the same
on both lines, firm A still operates at a lower production cost that C even though both of
them are allocative efficient. This is because A is more technically efficient and uses less




The statistical software Stata provides several functions to estimate data using the
stochastic frontier regression of both stochastic production and cost frontier models. For
more details about the frontier analysis see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).
The frontier command (xtfrontier and sfpanel for panel data) in Stata follows the
development of stochastic frontier problem in production. The most basic components
consist of: the most efficient firm produces the maximum output using the same level of
inputs and is considered as the “frontier” of production; other firms that produce lower
output level due to random error or a degree of inefficiency.
Mathematically expression is as follows.
qi = f (zi, β)ξiexp(vi) (B.1)
where qi is output which assumes to be strictly positive, zi is a vector of inputs, ξi is the
level of efficiency which must be in the interval (0, 1]–the efficient firm will have ξi equals
to 1, and vi is the random shocks component.
After taking the natural log, one should get




β j ln zji + vi − ui (B.2)
where ui is ln(ξi). In this expression ui ≥ 0 which implies that 0 < ξi ≤ 1.
By performing an analogous derivation in the dual cost function problem, the cost
frontier can be written as follows.




β j ln pji + vi − ui (B.3)
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where ci is cost and pji are input prices. Inefficiency in cost requires either the output level
is lower at the same cost or the expenditure is higher at the same output level.





β jxji + vi − sui (B.4)
given s =
{ 1, for production functions
-1, for cost functions
where yi = ln(qi), and xji = ln(zji) for a production function; and yi = ln(ci), and xji =
ln(pji) for a cost function. The term vi is the idiosyncratic errors independently N(0, σv)
distributed over the observation. In this study the inefficiency component is assumed to
be independently half-normally N+(µ, σ2u) distributed.
Stata version of stochastic frontier regression maximizes the log-likelihood function
by using the Newton-Raphson method (and Jondrow et al. (1982) for sfpanel). The log-























where σS = (σ2u + σ2v )1/2, λ = σu/σv, ei = yi − xiβ, and Φ() is the cumulative distribution
function of the standard normal distribution. The estimated variance-covariance matrix is
calculated as the inverse of the negative Hessian.
To estimate ui, the mean of the conditional distribution F(u|e) is













− sµ∗i + 12σ
2∗
) (B.7)
where µ∗i = −seiσ2u/σ2S and σ∗ = σuσv/σS.
The efficiency scores used in this study are efficiency scores which can be obtained via
E{exp(−sui)|ei}. The scores are between (0, 1] interval for production functions where the
score of 1 indicates that the firm is on the frontier. On the other hand, for cost functions, the
efficiency scores are in the range of [1,∞) where the score of 1 indicates the minimum cost
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which is the frontier where the efficient firm locates. The efficiency scores then compare
with the frontier efficiency to calculate the “inefficiency” scores that illustrate how far the
inefficient firms are from the frontier production (cost-minimization).
APPENDIX C
MLB TEAMS’ ABBREVIATIONS
Table C.1: MLB teams’ abbreviations
Team Abbreviation League
Arizona Diamondbacks ARI NL
Atlanta Braves ATL NL
Baltimore Orioles BAL AL
Boston Red Sox BOS AL
Chicago White Sox CHW AL
Chicago Cubs CHC NL
Cincinnati Reds CIN NL
Cleveland Indians CLE AL
Colorado Rockies COL NL
Detroit Tigers DET AL
Houston Astros HOU AL
Kansas City Royals KCR AL
Los Angeles Angels LAA AL
Los Angeles Dodgers LAD NL
Miami Marlins MIA NL
Milwaukee Brewers MIL NL
Minnesota Twins MIN AL
New York Mets NYM NL
New York Yankees NYY AL
Oakland Athletics OAK AL
Philadelphia Phillies PHI NL
Pittsburgh Pirates PIT NL
San Diego Padres SDP NL
San Francisco Giants SFG NL
Seattle Mariners SEA AL
St. Louis Cardinals STL NL
Tampa Bay Rays TBR AL
Texas Rangers TEX AL
Toronto Blue Jays TOR AL
Washington Nationals WSN NL
APPENDIX D
WIN SCORE
The calculation of win score appear in this paper follows the steps presented in Berri
(2008). The computation includes information from both free-agent and not-free agent
players. However, in order to be qualified as samples, players must appear in at least
20 games per season and have time spent on court more than a minimum of 12 min per
game. There are 1,410 qualified players in this study. Team statistics used to evaluate the
marginal value of each action are statistics per game while individual performance are
regular season performance.
D.1 Player’s Performance and Scoring
Each player contributes differently to his team’s victories base on his actions on court.
As a result, it is important to estimate the value of each action he performed on court to
determine his real contribution.
For a team to have a chance to score, they need to have a possession to the ball. Posses-
sions a team acquires (PA) are from
PA = DTO + REBD + REBTM + DFGM + d1DFTM (D.1)
where DTO is the number of turnovers made by the opponent team, REBD is the number
of teams’s defensive rebounds that can be credited to a specific player, REBTM is the
number of defensive rebounds that cannot be credited to an individual player, DFGM is
the number of field goals made by opponent and DFTM is the number of free throws
made by opponent. It should be noted that other circumstances beside free throws made
by opponent guarantee that the team will acquire a possession of the ball. However, it is
only a fraction of free throws made by opponent that the team will acquire a possession of
the ball. In other words, 0 < d1 < 1.
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In addition to PA that gives the possession of the ball to a team by rules, the team can
obtain the ball from offensive rebounds (REBO). Once the team has a possession of the
ball, a field goal attempt shall be made, except only if there is a turnover (TO). We can say
that the field goal attempt (FGA) is in the equation:
FGA = DTO + REBD + REBTM + DFGM + d1DFTM− TO + REBO− f1FTA (D.2)
where free throw attempts (FTA) are equal to a fraction of field goal attempts, since more
than one free throw can be taken on a given possession and 0 < f1 < 1. Rearrange
Equation (D.2), we get
FGADIF = d1DFTM− f1FTA (D.3)
given that FGADIF = FGA − (DTO + REBD + DFGM − TO). With the 2004/05 to
2014/2015 seasons’ data available from the NBA, the estimated value of d1 and f1 are pre-
sented in Table D.1. Provided that the constant term serves as possession-changing team
rebounds that is missing in the estimation of field goal attempts, REBTM = 4.571 + eit.
After substituting the estimated coefficient of DFTM back into Equation D.1, we get:
PA = DTO + REBD + REBTM + DFGM + 0.454DFTM. (D.4)
Turn to efficiency in scoring, offensive efficiency is the ability for teams to score once
they have a chance to score (that is, possession employed). The possessions employed (PE)
of any team can be calculated from the number of times the team attempted to shoot, no












matter whether it is successful or not, plus the chance that is missing, such as turnovers.
Offensive rebounds shall not be double-counted. In equation form,
PE = FGA + 0.429FTA + TO− REBO (D.5)
where FGA is the number of field goal attempt, FTA is the number of free throws attempt
(the coefficient 0.429 comes from Table D.1), TO is the number of team’s turnovers and
REBO is the number of offensive rebounds.
We can say that points scored (PTS) is determined by the number of possessions the





This is equivalent of saying that PA = PE (although in this dataset the average PA = 91





D.2 Scores and Wins
In a game, two competing teams alternate possessions with each other. So, at end of
the game, each team would have about the same number of possessions Oliver (2004) (in
this data PE = DPE = 95 and PA = DPA = 91). Since the number of possessions a team
employed and acquired is virtually identical to the number of the opponent’s possessions
employed and acquired, PA, a factor that positively impacts wins, must cancel a factor that
negatively impacts wins, DPA. Also, DPE is virtually equivalent to the team’s PA. We can
connect team’s offensive and defensive efficiency to wins by estimating
Wins = α0 + α1OE + α2DE (D.8)
where Wins is the team’s winning percentage, OE is the team’s offensive efficiency ( PTSPE ),
and DE is the team’s defensive efficiency ( DPTSDPE or
DPTS
PA ). The regression result of Equation
D.8 using data from season 2004/05 to 2014/2015 is in Table D.2.
From our data, the mean of PTS = 98.931, the mean of DPTS = 98.929, the mean of PE
= 95.031, and the mean of PA = 90.548. After taking the derivative of wins with respect
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to PTS, PE, DPTS, and PA, respectively, the marginal values of player and team factors in
term of wins are calculated as presented in Table D.3.
From Table D.3, Equation D.4, and Equation D.5, we can compute the marginal value
of player and team defensive factors as presented in Table D.4.
D.3 The Missing Components
Other three actions that are not on the list yet are personal fouls, blocked shots, and
assists. When a player commits a personal foul, free throws are rewarded to the opponent
team. Although not all personal fouls lead to free throws, it is fair to distribute percentages
of opponent free throws from Table D.4 to each player according to the percentages of their
personal fouls. Since not every personal foul leads to free throw made by opponent, the
impact of personal fouls on free throw made by opponent can be found from a regression
of personal foul (PF) on opponent’s free throw made (DFTM). The results is in Table D.5.
Each free throw made by the opponent costs the team 0.016 wins.1 As a result, each
personal foul costs the team 1.093× 0.016 = 0.018 wins.
Block shots reduce the chance of opponent gaining two-point field goal. As a result,
we can determine the value of a block shot by regressing opponent’s two-point field goal
made on blocked shot (BLK) and field goal attempt (DFGA). The result is in Table D.6.
Since one two-points field goal made by the opponent team costs the team (0.032 × 2)
- 0.035 = 0.031 wins, and one blocked shot reduces the chance of a two-points field goal by
32.3%, each blocked shot is worth 0.031× 0.323 = 0.010 wins.
The only missing component so far is the value of assists. As noted in Berri, Schmidt,
and Brook (2007), the value of assist is not always statistically significant in determining
players’ wins produced and in the models that it is statistically significant, the marginal
effect is small. Hence, for simplicity, the marginal value of 0.022 as found in Berri et al.
(2007) is used.
Given all the marginal value of each actions on court, we can summarize the value of a
player’s actions on court in Table D.7.
1Since every point made by opponent costs the team 0.032 wins (DPTS = -0.032) and every free throw
attempt by the opponent uses up a chance of the opponent team (and benefit the team) by 0.016 wins, each
free throw made cost the team 0.032 - 0.016 = 0.016 wins
91

















Table D.4: Marginal value of player and team defensive factors





















Dummy variables for each team and year were in-
cluded in the model. t-statistics in parentheses.








Dummy variables for each team and year were in-
cluded in the model. t-statistics in parentheses.
Table D.7: Marginal value of player and team defensive factors
Player Factor Marginal Value
Three-point field goal made (3FGM) 0.060
Two-point field goal made (2FGM) 0.030
Free throw made (FTM) 0.017
Missed field goal (FGMS) -0.032
Missed free throw (FTMS) -0.014
Offensive rebound (REBO) 0.032
Defensive rebound (REBD) 0.035
Turnovers (TOV) -0.032
Steal (STL) 0.035
Opponent’s free throw made (DFTM) -0.018
Blocked shot (BLK) 0.010
Assist (AST) 0.022
Team Defensive Factors Marginal Value
Opponent’s three-point field goal made (D3FGM) -0.062
Opponent’s two-point field goal made (D2FGM) -0.029
Opponent’s turnover (DTOV) 0.035
Team rebound (REBTM) 0.035
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D.4 Evaluation of Player’s Production
A player’s production can be evaluated from marginal values presented in Table D.7.
This can be expressed in the equation form as follows.
PROD48 =[(3FGM× 0.060) + (2FGM× 0.030) + (FTM× 0.017)+
(FGMS×−0.032) + (FTMS×−0.014)+
(REBO× 0.032) + (REBD× 0.035) + (TOV ×−0.032)+
(STL× 0.035) + (DFTM×−0.018) + (BLK× 0.010)+
(AST × 0.022)]× (48/MP)
(D.9)
where the list of variables is in Table D.7 and MP is minutes played. It should be empha-
sized that the calculation converts player’s production to production per 48 min played in
order to equalize the difference in time spent on court.
Since basketball is a team sport, teammates actions also affect player’s performance. In
order to adjust for teammates environment, accumulated block shots, and assists of each
team are calculated and compared with the league average, in the particular season, per
48 min played.
MATE48 =[(BLKTM× 0.010) + (ASTTM× 0.022)]−
[(BLKLG× 0.010) + (ASTLG× 0.022)]/MPTM× 48
(D.10)
where BLKTM is team’s accumulated block shots, ASTTM is accumulated team assists,
BLKLG is the league average block shots, ASTLG is the league average assists, and MPTM
is team’s total minutes played.
Player’s sole production per 48 min (P48) can be found through
P48 = PROD48−MATE48. (D.11)
There are five positions in basketball; some positions are capable of scoring more than
others. In order to correct for this imbalance, each P48 is adjusted for player’s position.
Average P48 of each position for each season is observed and subtracted from player’s P48
to get P48 by Position (Adj.P48)
Adj.P48 = P48− Position Average P48. (D.12)
The missing components at the bottom part of Table D.7 are team defensive perfor-
mance factors that cannot be traced back to any individual player. Since these are teams’
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performance, we can distribute the contribution across the players, according to the min-
utes the player was placed on court. The team defensive adjustment is calculated relative
to league average defensive adjustment to capture the comparative team performance that
the players belong to. It is then added to player’s Adj.P48 so that
RelativeAdj.P48 = Adj.P48+ DEFTM48 (D.13)
where DEFTM48 is team defensive adjustment per 48 min relative to league average (DEFTM
= League Average Defensive Adjustment - Team Defensive Adjustment) and team de-
fensive adjustment is calculated from the value in Table D.7 (plus team’s blocked shot,
BLKTM) and team’s performance statistics.
De f ensiveAdjustment =[(D3FGM×−0.062) + (D2FGM×−0.029)+
(DTOV × 0.035) + (REBTM× 0.035)]/MPTM× 48
(D.14)
The average winning percentage is 0.500 games. Since there are five players on court at
a time, we can say that one player produces 0.500÷ 5 = 0.100 wins per 48 min. However,
teams sometimes play overtime games and the actual average wins produced per 48 min is
0.099 instead of 0.100. Once added the Relative Adj. P48 to average player’s performance
of 0.099, player’s wins produced per 48 min is determined
WP48 = RelativeAdj.P48+ 0.099). (D.15)
In the final step, by dividing player’s WP48 by 48, and multiply it by the actual minutes
played, the actual win score of each player can be obtained
WS = WP48/48×MP. (D.16)
APPENDIX E
CONJOINT ANALYSIS
E.1 Choice-Based Conjoint Analysis Experiment
The conjoint analysis is widely used in the field of psychology and marketing (Green &
Srinivasan, 1978; Gustafsson, Herrmann, & Huber, 2007). The most commonly used type
of conjoint analysis nowadays is the choice-based conjoint (CBC) method (Orme, 2013, p.
39).
In market research that uses CBC, the main goal is to find the path-specific utility or
preference of each characteristic of product or option for a population or an individual
(Taneva, Giesen, Zolliker, & Mueller, 2008). More details on path-specific utility will be
discussed later.
The characteristics considered to influence purchasing decisions of consumers are mostly
selected from interviews of sample group of customers. Each characteristic is called an
“attribute” and will be divided into “levels” with the minimum of two levels per attribute.
For example, package color could be considered as one of the attributes, its levels could
be black, yellow, and red. The number of levels must not be too large nor too small.
Instead, it must be big enough to present a realistic situation and not too small to gather
necessary information (Hair et al., 2005, p. 495). To avoid multicollinearity bias, the chosen
attributes should not linearly correlate with each others (Hair et al., 2005, chapter 4). Also,
to avoid the information overload problem during the experiments, it is suggested that
any choice-based conjoint analysis should not consist of more than 6 attributes (Green &
Srinivasan, 1990; Hair et al., 2005).
“Profiles” or “cards” are designed by putting together combinations of levels from
every attribute by a process called “factorial design.” In this process, levels from every
attribute are randomly put together to assure that each of them will be presented on the
96
profiles at approximately an equal number of time (level balance). It is worth mentioning
that, although, the levels are said to be “randomly” put together, they are carefully chosen
so that each profile will be unique to each other and can represent each attribute as much
as possible. This also helps reducing the psychological contexts and order effects, in
which some respondents may only pay attention to the attribute that is presented first
in each profile (Sawtooth Software, Inc., 2001). This can be done by the conforming to
the following principles: “Minimal overlap” requires each attributes level to be presented
as few times possible in a single task. “Orthogonality” requires that attribute levels are
chosen independently of other attribute levels (Sawtooth Software, Inc., 2001).
The respondents will be asked to perform “choice tasks”. In each task, they will be
presented with two or more profiles (so-called “choice set” or “stimulus”) at a time and
asked to choose only one profile that they think is the most preferable combination. The
minimum number of choice tasks can be as little as one task, depending on the number of
respondents. The maximum number of choice sets for any research, however, should not
exceed 30 stimuli. This is the suggested number that is proven to be the best number of
choice set, not too large to overwhelm the respondents, nor too small to gather the neces-
sary information (Sawtooth Software, Inc., 2003). It should be noted that some stimuli must
be considered with close attention. Some sets of cards might not provide any information
and should not be included in the task. For example, a profile with superior level in every
attribute should not be presented together with a profile with all inferior level of attributes
(Orme, 2013, Chapter 6).
E.2 Estimation of Path-Worth Utilities and Preference Scores
The data observed will be estimated using econometric tools, such as multinomial logit
estimation (MNL) and hierarchical Bayes estimation (HB). The selection of methodology
used depends on the purpose of the researcher and the suitability of data. The researcher
will be able to determine the “path-worth utility” of each level of all attributes the con-
sumers put on the product or option from such estimations.
Multinomial logit estimation (MNL) is used in this study. In CBC studies, MNL model
is commonly used with the aggregate model. It seeks weights for attribute levels which
are analogous to utilities in the conjoint analysis. The sum of weights can be compared to
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the total utility of the attribute and is related to respondents’ choices among concepts. The
completed steps of utility estimation can be found in Rao (2014). As stated earlier, the main
goal of the conjoint analysis is to find the “path-worth utility” of each level of attributes.
First, it is assumed that




where u˜k: Individual’s random path-worth utility of attribute k
vk: Individual’s deterministic path-worth utility for attribute k
ek: Individual’s random component of the utility for attribute k
xjk: Dummy variables represented the observed value (characteristic) of
level j of attribute k
T The numbers of variables included in the model.
In each choice task, respondents must choose the most preferable profile. For simplicity,
let’s assume that there are two profiles, j and m, presented at a time. Hence, the probability
of choosing profile j (express as P[yj])can be derived as follows:
P[yj = 1] = P[u˜j ≥ u˜m; m ∈ S]
= P[vj + ej ≥ vm + em; m ∈ S]
= P[ej − em ≥ vm − vj; n ∈ S]








1+∑ exp(vm − vj)
(E.3)
















β jm(xjm − xjk)
] . (E.5)
The only unknown parameter is β which can be estimated. Then, the marginal effects
can be found by ∂Pj∂xj .
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For example, let’s assume that a market research aims to study the demand for product
X in the market. According to the interviews from sample group of customers, charac-
teristic A and B are considered as the only two attributes consumers care about when
making purchasing decisions. Both attributes can be divided into two levels: 1 and 2. The
researcher can put these levels together and comes up with 2× 2 = 4 profiles:
• Profile 1: A1 and B1
• Profile 2: A1 and B2
• Profile 3: A2 and B1
• Profile 4: A2 and B2
Assume that the researcher decides to show two profiles at a time in each task, he will
have the total of 4!2!(4−2)! = 6 tasks possible:
• Task 1: Profile 1 and Profile 2
• Task 2: Profile 1 and Profile 3
• Task 3: Profile 1 and Profile 4
• Task 4: Profile 2 and Profile 3
• Task 5: Profile 2 and Profile 4
• Task 6: Profile 3 and Profile 4
It should be noted here that it is not necessary to present every task to each respondent.
The number of task presented to each respondent shall be selected based on the number of
respondent and the amount of information contained in each task. The respondents will
be asked to choose one of the two profiles in each task. The probability of choosing will be
1 for the selected profile. If all possible tasks in this example are to be asked in the conjoint
tasks, a total of six observations will be obtained from each respondent. These observations
will be used in the estimation of path-worth utilities, follows the mathematical derivation
presented previously.
Let’s assume that respondent Z chooses Profile 1 over Profile 2 in his first choice task.
This, by assumptions, means that he prefers Profile 1 over Profile 2; hence, his utility of
Profile 1 is greater than his utility of Profile 2. His utility of Profile 1 comes from his
utility of attribute level A1 and B1 together. Meanwhile, his utility of attribute level A1
and B2 add up to the utility of Profile 2. In mathematical expression, it can be written as
uA1 + uB1 > uA1 + uB2, where ui is respondent Z’s path-worth utility of attribute level i.
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In the process of estimation, the dependent variable is the probability of choosing a
particular profile (1 if choosing or 0 if otherwise). The independent variables consist of
dummy variables representing attribute levels presented in the choice task (1 if presented
or 0 otherwise). Since each task is unique to others, in other words, every task has its’ own
model, the regular logit or probit estimation cannot be done.
Each task will be considered as one observation. In this case, one respondent completes
six tasks. As a result, six observations will be observed. If five respondents were asked to
perform the conjoint tasks, a total of 6× 5 = 30 observations will be used in the estimation.
The individual’s deterministic path-worth utility of each attribute level will be estimated
using Equation (5), in which β coefficients are the utilities. Since, we only compare two
unique profiles at a time, it is possible that the respondent might choose Profile 1 over
Profile 2, Profile 2 over Profile 3, but Profile 3 over Profile 1. As a result, the estimation can
begin from any task or any “iteration.” However, no matter which iteration the researcher
chooses to begin with, the results should be similar.
After the path-worth utility of each attribute level is estimated, the utilities of different
levels in the same attribute will be added up as respondent Z’s deterministic path-worth
utility for that particular attribute. In our example, uA1 and uA2 are estimated, after adding
them up, the utility of attribute A (uA) can be calculated. This will be the same for calcu-
lating the path-worth utility of attribute B. Assume that there are five respondents in this
study, the utility of each level of attribute A will be estimated using all of the responses (in
this case 5 × 6 = 30) and the utility of the attribute will be calculated in the same manner
as in one respondent case.
Since the utilities are estimated attribute by attribute, there could be a magnitude prob-
lem in which the estimated utility of one attribute is far greater than others. This does not
mean that the attribute with higher utility is more preferable than others. The estimated
values only represent the probability of choosing one attribute level in comparison to
others. As a result, the estimated utilities are normally rescaled for the purpose of interpre-
tation. The most common way is “zero-center rescaling” method. The estimated utilities in
each attribute will be rescaled so that the total utility value within each attribute is equal to
zero. A higher (rescaled) utility implies a higher preferable, however, a level with 200 utils
does not mean it is double preferable than a level with 100 utils. Also, a negative utility
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does not mean that the level is not preferable, it is only the effect of zero-centered rescaling
as mentioned earlier. Furthermore, since the utilities are rescaled within each attribute, it
shall not be used to compare across the attributes, for example, A1 level in our example
happens to have a higher utility than B2 but it does not mean that A1 is more preferable
than B2.
The estimated path-worth utilities help providing some insights into preference of
each respondent on each characteristic of the product. The firm can launch the product
containing the characteristics that best match the target consumers’ demand at the right
price using this information (Orme, 2013, Chapter 9).
In the conjoint analyses, “preference scores’’ are the main concerns. After path-worth
utilities for all the levels in every attribute are calculated, the preference score for each
attribute can be found by the following formula:







These preference scores (or average importance) will be between 0 and 1, which are
normally converted into 0-100 scales for simplicity. This tells the relative importance each
person gives to an attribute, relative to other attributes.
The advantage of the CBC conjoint analysis is that it is more realistic than rating or
ranking the products (which is done in the traditional conjoint analysis) since people
are always facing trade-off situations in everyday life (Louveire & Woodworth, 1983).
The “interaction effect” can also be estimated to see the decisions made by respondents
when they base their choices on the combination of products’ characteristics. This is an
advantage of the CBC conjoint analysis over the traditional conjoint analysis that only
presents the “main effect” by adding up the utilities of each attribute (Sawtooth Software,
Inc., 2001). For example, in a market research which the researcher wants to study the
preference of color and shape of the product, in the study that uses main effect, the utility
of “round and blue” product can be found by simply add up the path-worth utility of
“round” and the path-worth utility of “blue”. In comparison, the interaction effect allows
the researcher to directly estimate the utility of the “round and blue” as an attribute, which




Table F.1: Participating resorts’ characteristics
Characteristics Total (19)
VTF/H [000] 0-2,999 (10) 3,000-5,999 (4) 6,000-11,999 (2) 12,000+ (3)
Visitor/year [000] <100 (10) 100-250 (6) 250-550 (2) >550 (1)
Skiable acreage 80 (8) 250 (3) 800 (3) 1900 (2) n.a. (2)
Snow making acreage 40 (10) 100 (3) 150 (1) 330 (3) n.a. (2)
Days open 90 (7) 100 (5) 130 (3) 150 (4)
Owned by government Yes (3) No (16)
Have ski school Yes (19) No (0)
Have restaurant(s) Yes (17) No (2)
Have lodge(s) Yes (16) No (3)
Have ski shop(s) Yes (17) No (2)
Night ski service Yes (16) No (3)
Nursery service Yes (7) No (12)
Operate off-season Yes (10) No (9)
Proximity to the major airport
by road
<1 Hr (11) 1-2 Hrs (5) 2-3 Hrs (3) >3 Hrs (0)
Region Northeast (6) Southeast (0) Midwest (6) Rocky Mountain (4)
Pacific South (0) Pacific North (3) More than one (0)
Target group of customers National (3) Regional (9) Local (7)
Size of competitors’ resorts Smaller (6) Same size (7) Bigger (14)
(check all that applied)
APPENDIX G
QUESTIONNAIRES
Figure G.1: Example of a conjoint task
103
Which of these can best describe the characteristics of the resort(s) you are in responsible for
making advertising decisions? (If you are responsible more than one resort then please use the
total number of all the resorts.)
VTF/H [000] 0-2,999 3,000-5,999 6,000-11,999 12,000+
Visitor/year [000] <100 100-250 250-550 >550
Skiable acreage 80 250 800 1900
Snow making acreage 40 100 150 330
Days open 90 100 130 150
Owned by government Yes No
Have ski school Yes No
Have restaurant(s) Yes No
Have lodge(s) Yes No
Have ski shop(s) Yes No
Night ski service Yes No
Nursery service Yes No
Operate off-season Yes No
Proximity to the major airport by road <1 Hr 1-2 Hrs 2-3 Hrs >3 Hrs
Region Northeast Southeast Midwest Rocky Mountain
Pacific South Pacific North More than one
Target group of customers National Regional Local
Size of competitors’ resorts Smaller Same size Bigger
(check all that applied) 2 2 2
Figure G.2: Example of general questions
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